60 The Economist April 16th 2022
Finance & economics
TechinChina
Xi’s incubator state
T
hings arelooking bright for Zhuzhou.
The city of 4m people in landlocked
Hunan province has often caught the run
off of industrial business from the more
populous provincial capital, Changsha, to
its north. In the 1990s it became a regional
hub for chemicals and metals production.
But that caused horrible environmental
destruction; more than 1,000 polluters
were eventually shut down, with dire eco
nomic consequences. Zhuzhou’s inland
economy has remained behind that of
coastal cities. Over the past decade its
moderate growth has been typical of the
midtier cities that dot China’s interior.
Now, however, its officials talk as if it
were a tech hub. Hundreds of artificialin
telligence (ai), robotics and data compa
nies have sprung up in the past year. Local
planning documents reflect the exuber
ance of a boomtown in the making, some
thing Zhuzhou could only watch from afar
in the 1990s as eastern ports became rich.
The documents refer to “great changes
not seen in 100 years”, a phrase that has
been used by Xi Jinping, China’s president,
to signify the start of a new era. He believes
China is on the verge of a revolution in
which dozens of cities will begin produc
ing breakthroughs in robotics, cloud com
puting and automation. Zhuzhou’s offi
cials also believe they are poised to reap
the rewards of Mr Xi’s “common prosperi
ty” campaign—a plan to redistribute
wealth from richer regions to poorer ones,
and from the dominant internet platforms
to consumers and workers.
Mr Xi’s strategy is best understood as a
weighty bet that China is on track to be
come the world’s centre of innovation over
the next decade. A shift towards home
grown tech is altering the geographical
layout of China’s manufacturing machine.
New investment and migration are being
rerouted from rich coastal hubs to inland
cities such as Zhuzhou. A second feature is
an unprecedented rise in the number of
new tech companies. The government is
nurturing thousands of groups, big and
small, in the fields of data science, network
security and robotics. Mr Xi and his advis
ers are also taking firmer control over mar
kets. Their ability to direct capital flows is
already evident in how privateequity
groups invest in China.
This shift comes at a definitive mo
ment. The narrative that America and the
West are in decline, and that China is ris
ing, appears frequently in state media. And
yet China has not been more inwardlook
ing since it was condemned international
ly after the Tiananmen Square massacre in
1989. The business hub of Shanghai, a city
of 25m people, has been locked down as Mr
Xi seeks to eradicate covid19. His support
for Russia during the war in Ukraine has
raised the potential for more sanctions on
Chinese firms. These conditions seem on
ly to strengthen his desire for selfreliance.
Mr Xi is building an incubator state: an
economy that relies heavily on govern
ment nourishment to create productivity
gains with domestic research and technol
ogy. In doing so he is also signalling a pre
S HANGHAI
China’s plan to become the world’s next centre of innovation
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