The Economist April 16th 2022 67
Science & technology
Trackingshipping
Who’s who on the ocean blue
N
ever before have the activities of
oceangoing vessels been under so
much scrutiny. So says Oleg Ustenko, the
economics adviser to Volodymyr Zelensky,
Ukraine’s president, and a leader of a gov
ernment initiative called the Russian
Tanker Tracking Group (rttg). Working
with tips from a network of experts and
spies, including foreign officials who con
tribute on the sly, the rttg, Dr Ustenko
says, tracks the energy shipments with
which “Russia is desperately trying to fi
nance its military machine”.
Despite the sanctions imposed by
America and Europe, most of Russia’s en
ergy shipments have remained legal. Out
rage over its war on Ukraine, however, has
left many firms keen to avoid the reputa
tional risks of dealing with entities or
goods of Russian origin. Beyond that, as
the pandemic and war have tightened
commodity markets, the value of detailed
data on shipments has risen. As Reid I’An
son of the Houston office of Kpler, a firm of
commodities analysts, notes, even traders
who won’t buy illicit oil can make better
decisions if they can gauge how much
sanctioned countries such as Iran are man
aging to smuggle out.
Technology hopes to provide such in
formation. The rttg, for example, uses
“network analysis” software to find reveal
ing relationships among disparate bits of
information. The group is already notch
ing up successes. These include identify
ing shipments of Kazakh oil believed to
contain portions of clandestinely loaded
Russian crude, says Dr Ustenko. Alerts are
sent to relevant governments and firms, as
well as several Ukrainian ministries.
Data from ship transponders inform
much of the analysis. Big commercial ves
sels must transmit their location and an
identifying code to networks of terrestrial
and satellite receivers known as the Auto
matic Identification System (ais). Some
thing as simple as an unusual acceleration
may be a clue that a crew is buying time for
an illicit deal. But the key to flagging po
tential mischief, says Ivan Ladan, the boss
of Marine Digital, an analytics firm in Lü
beck, Germany, is to use software that ana
lyses the behaviour of ships in light of ma
ny different bits of information.
Marine Digital’s software, for instance,
examines a ship’s declared cargo, route,
and insurance details, as well as historical
navigation patterns in various weather and
market conditions. Crime and corruption
in different places are also taken into ac
count. The software is even fed port re
cords on how low a vessel sits in the water,
revealing the tonnage of cargo aboard.
When it smells something fishy, the firm
alerts authorities and its clients, mostly
shipowners unhappy to hear that one of
their leased vessels may be up to no good.
Sanctionsbusting often involves trans
fers of cargo between ships, far from the
eyes of port authorities. Vortexa, a London
based firm, runs software that looks for
these “transshipments”. One clue is when
a full and an empty vessel built to carry the
same type of cargo meet away from crowd
ed shipping lanes. Vortexa’s software also
looks for encounters between a vessel that
has a dodgy reputation and one that does
not (or does not yet). The latter are pre
ferred for passing off sanctioned cargo as a
legitimate delivery. A ship’s age also mat
ters. The riskier the voyage, the older the
vessel is likely to be.
It is too soon to see how efforts to dodge
Crowdsourced data, satellites and clever algorithms try to catch
ocean-going blockade runners
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