198 THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
"The Inadequacy of 'Natural Selection.'" He strongly supported the Lamarckian
principle of use and disuse with inheritance of acquired characters and, while not
denying the importance of Darwin's principle, railed against the exclusivity
claimed for natural selection by August Weismann and his school, variously
labelled as "strict," or "ultra" or "neo" Darwinism. Weismann quickly rose to the
challenge, choosing for his title a phrase that would become a motto for his
approach. He called his rebuttal, in German, and parrying Spencer directly: Die
Allmacht der Naturzuchtung—a title rendered by the English translator as "The
All-Sufficiency of Natural Selection" (although I would prefer "Omnipotence," or
the literal "All-Might").
This exchange (Spencer, 1893a and b; Weismann, 1893) became the focal
point and most widely cited set of documents in the great debate between "neo-
Darwinism" and "neo-Lamarckism," perhaps the hottest subject in evolutionary
theory at the end of the 19th century (see Kellogg, who wrote, 1907, p. 134—"The
best known part of the general debate was that carried on directly by Weismann
and Spencer in the Contemporary Review." These terms, as so often noted, bear
little relation to the chief concerns of the name-bearers. Neo-Lamarckians
bypassed Lamarck's central concept of materialistic progress and focused on a
theory of heredity that Lamarck espoused as the folk wisdom of his day, not as
anything distinctive in his system. Neo-Darwinism referred to the panselectionism
of Weismann and Wallace, an attitude explicitly and pointedly rejected by Darwin,
who gave selection pride of place (hence the association), but granted other forces
(including "Lamarckism") important, if lesser, roles in evolutionary change).
Passions ran high; I own Weismann's annotated copies of Spencer's articles,
and his anger drips off the pages (Fig. 3-4). The two warriors thrusted and parried
on both high and low roads, mixing some good arguments about the structure of
evolutionary explanation with ad hominem charges of incompetence. Weismann
(1893, p. 317) disparaged Spencer for being merely a philosopher, and not a true
scientist: " [I] can only explain Mr. Spencer's ignoring such cogent instances by
supposing that, as a philosopher, he is unacquainted with the facts by personal
observation, and that therefore they appear less weighty to him than to a naturalist;
for I would not for a moment suppose that he purposely evades the difficulties
which face his opinion, as is the manner of popular orators and advocates—and
alas! even of some scientists." Spencer, in his touché (1893, p. 23), replied, not
entirely without justice as we shall see, that Weismann had hidden poor arguments
under the cloak of authority as a practicing scientist: "Now it is doubtless true that
as a naturalist he may claim for his 'opinion' a relatively great weight. Still, in
pursuance of the method of science, it seems to me that something more than an
opinion is required as the basis for a far-reaching theory."
But he can lay claim to at least one undoubted legacy in our parish; he popularized and
won acceptance for the name of our subject, a word that Darwin initially rejected and
adopted with resignation only late in life after Spencer's usage had triumphed (Gould,
1977b)—evolution.