308 THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
Cuvier stated (in Geoffroy, 1830, pp. 248-249), belittling the idea of unity of type:
"It [unity of type] is only a principle subordinate to another that is much more
important and much more fecund—that of the conditions of existence, of the fitting
of parts and their coordination for the role that the animal must play in nature. This
is the true philosophical principle, from which flows the possibility of certain
resemblances, and the impossibility of others; this is the rational principle from
which one may deduce that of analogies [homologies in modern usage] of plan and
composition."
With Meyranx, Laurencet and mollusks forgotten (to Cuvier's satisfaction and
Geoffroy's relief), the debate moved on to greater generalities of formalism vs.
functionalism. Geoffroy replied briefly on February 22, and then, on March 1,
presented a general defense of his theorie des analogues (homologies), illustrated
primarily with his old favorite example of hyoid bones in fishes and tetrapods. On
March 8, Geoffroy had fallen ill and Cuvier refused to deliver his rebuttal in his
colleague's absence. The large crowd, lured by the promised fireworks more than
the putative content, dispersed in disappointment. Cuvier replied in kind by failing
to attend the following week; tit for tat. The debate finally resumed on March 22,
with Cuvier's rebuttal of Geoffroy's claims for hyoid homologies. Geoffroy
defended himself on March 29, but he had clearly tired of the affair, for he stated,
with more than a whiff of disingenuous disengagement, that "a meeting of the
disciples of the Portico" had regretfully turned into theater—"a pit applauding the
outrageous comedies of Aristophanes" (quoted in Appel, 1987, pp. 154-155).
Cuvier replied one last time on April 5, but Geoffroy ended the public debate by
announcing that he would not respond. Cuvier surely enjoyed advantages as a
brilliant debater and consummate politician, but we must not consider Geoffroy
either devoid of wiliness, or willing to surrender. He merely shifted ground to the
more comfortable medium of print. By April 15, in a fit of zeal and celerity as
impressive as anything achieved with our current technology of instant books,
Geoffroy had sent to the printers the text of his Principes de philosophic
zoologique, containing all papers and commentary presented by Cuvier and himself
during the public debate. (Several years ago, I had the good fortune to purchase
Cuvier's own copy of this work. The book bears Cuvier's library stamp (Fig. 4-11),
but I find no sign, in marginalia or any other indication of use, that the great man
ever consulted the volume!)
Intellectual debates of such grand scale and diverse content can never be won
or lost in the unambiguous fashion of more worldly events, as when Joe Louis
knocked out Max Schmeling. Most biological texts (Russell, 1916, for example)
proclaim Cuvier the victor—surely a fair judgment for the narrow, initiating topic
of molluscan homologies. But the debate quickly moved from this immediate
instigation to the broadest question of formalism vs. functionalism—an issue that
cannot be resolved as total victory or defeat. Moreover, the debate embodied a
hundred subtexts in sociology, philosophy, and politics—open vs. closed meetings
of the Academie, facts vs. theory in science, elites vs. populism in research—and
all these swirling, largely orthogonal themes could not fall into a single pattern of
victory for one side.