482 THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
in the 1850's, that the fossil record of vertebrates exhibited vectorial change, and
when Darwin then argued so persuasively that evolution could serve Lyell as a
strategy of minimal retreat, permitting him to retain all other major components of
his world view, while moving to acknowledge life's directional history. Gradualism
then became—and has remained ever since—the sole surviving cardinal claim of
uniformity in the substantive mode.
In his most clever, and devastatingly effective, trope of rhetoric, Lyell argued
that the substantive claims of "uniformity" must be valid because the basic practice
of science requires that we accept a set of methodological assumptions bearing the
same name despite their truly different status ("uniformity" of law and process). In
so doing, Lyell managed to elevate a testable claim about gradualism to the status
of a received a priori doctrine vital to the successful practice of science itself. This
subtle conflation has exerted a profound, and largely negative, influence upon
geology ever since, often serving to limit and stifle hypotheses about rates of
processes, and to bring derision upon those who advocated even local catastrophes.
(Consider the now standard story of J Harlen Bretz and his long reviled, but later
vindicated, catastrophic explanation for the channelled scablands of Washington
by sudden flooding—Gould, 1980d; Baker and Nummedal, 1978.) In the obvious
contemporary example (see Chapter 12 for details), no one can comprehend the
emotional vigor of the debate engendered by Alvarez's proposal for catastrophic
mass extinction by extraterrestrial impact (Alvarez et al., 1980, and the oral history
of Glen, 1994) without understanding the historical legacy of Lyell's successful
and tricky rhetorical argument against catastrophism.
Ernst Mach and many others have truly (and famously) noted that, for "big"
issues, scientific reform proceeds largely by persuading the next generation.
Mach's claim has usually been cited in the somewhat cynical mode: one must wait
for the old generation to die because nothing can change their minds. But the same
transgenerational theme applies, in an oddly backwards manner, to false
characterizations that win assent by force of rhetoric. Such misattributions don't
persuade contemporaries who understand the subtleties of the real issues by direct
experience. But, since historical memory tends to occupy only a narrow range from
nonexistent to short among scientists, false versions begin to prevail as soon as the
actual practitioners die, and cardboard can quickly replace flesh. Thus, anyone who
knew Cuvier, Elie de Beaumont, or d'Orbigny, recognized their mental power,
their scientific integrity, and the considerable empirical support enjoyed by their
systems. But when these men died, Lyell's characterization persisted, and
"catastrophism" became equated with anti-science and dogmatic theological
reaction. The label stuck, and Lyell's rhetorical triumph placed catastrophism
beyond the pale of scientific respectability.
The arms of misreason extend across generations. When primary documents
disappear from sight, * textbook pap can clone itself, and resulting legends
*Not nefariously, in this case, for the great works of Cuvier and other catastrophists
have always remained on library shelves, and have been much valued by historians and
collectors.