204 A CREATIVE COGNITIONcognition. For example, sheep fl ock toward the sound of a tractor, because
they have learned to associate it with impending delivery of food. Th e
associations— and associations of associations— are kept in memory as
knowledge stores. Th ey may be activated by stimuli in current experi-
ence, when the learned associations are played out in responses. For
example, sight of a tail wagging from behind a sofa retrieves the image of
a whole dog.
Associationist models became very popu lar in the 1970s, when they
could be simulated (and further modeled) on computers. Of course this
development, as with the original theory, assumed some sort of built-in
pro cessing just to register the associations. So investigators started to
introduce other forms of ready- made pro cesses in ready- made sequences.
As a consequence, basic associationism merged with some basic nativist
assumptions to form the computational view of cognition.
Th e computational view holds that cognitive functions can be de-
scribed as sets of built-in programs (or apps) in specialized neural net-
works (modules). Together they register, store, and utilize associations
under the supervision of a central executive, much as computer programs
work with a central pro cessor, subroutines, and data fi les to pro cess
information and reach decisions or actions.
Since the 1960s, that combined computational model has been virtu-
ally synonymous with cognitive psy chol ogy. As Tony Stone and Martin
Davies explain, “A fundamental princi ple of con temporary cognitive psy-
chol ogy is that cognition involves the storage and pro cessing of informa-
tion and that this information pro cessing is achieved by the pro cessing
or transformation of structured mental repre sen ta tions.”^7
Th is is the basic model now implicitly or explic itly adopted in applied
contexts such as health or education. For example, Roderick Wallace
and Deborah Wallace say that “the essence of cognitive function involves
comparison of a perceived signal with an internal, learned or inherited
picture of the world, and then, upon that comparison, choice of one re-
sponse from a much larger repertoire of pos si ble responses.”^8 (Th ey do,
however, go on to discuss cognition as “language.”)
Of course, it has been pointed out many times that the elemental
inputs of associationism hardly correspond at all with the raw, dynamic
fl ux of experience. Th ey are ready- processed, meaningful, parcels of
information, contrived for research con ve nience. And what the central
This content downloaded from 139.184.14.159 on Tue, 17 Oct 2017 13:54:24 UTChttp://www.ebook3000.com