MARK MOES471c. In the section running from 471c to the end of book 7, philosophic
rule is contrasted with the delusory order of the totalitarian, coercive,
and cavelike povli~ of books 2– 5. Books 8 and 9 show how the supposedly
just “aristocratic” regime will anyway self-destruct and transform from
a hidden tyranny into a manifest one; by implication an “aristocratic”
soul, in which reason, split off from passion, has failed to bring desires
into harmonious relation, will self-destruct as well. Socrates’ objective
all along is to show the impossibility of conserving and hiding forever
the deceptions and self-deceptions in sick “aristocracies” or in falsely
“aristocratic” souls.^87
If this is Socrates’ strategy with Glaucon, Thrasymachus comes off
as having more integrity than Glaucon, not less. For whereas he acts
consistently with his views, Glaucon is torn between the life of Thra-
symachus and the life of Socrates. If he is to get anywhere with Glau-
con, Socrates must not merely argue that the just life is superior to other
lives.^88 He must bring Glaucon to a deeper self-encounter. Failing this,
Glaucon will accept the argument on the level of notional apprehen-
sion, but then go on to rationalize his own grabs for coercive power
over others in the name of justice, because his subterranean desires will
not have been exposed and transformed. Socrates cannot just bluntly
accuse Glaucon of being an ignorant young idealist with “impracti-
cal expectations.” (See Socrates’ questions to Adeimantus at 494c– d.)
Socrates must proceed by indirection, not for logical reasons, but for
psychological and pedagogical reasons. He must use not only dialecti-
cal, but also non-dialectical, techniques of rhetoric.^89 Glaucon says that
he does not espouse Thrasymachus’ accounts of justice and excellence,
and he is no doubt sincere. But sincerely to avow adherence to certain
values is one thing, and to live in a way consistent with such an avowal is
another. For there can be an apprehension of value that is merely verbal
or notional but which falls short of a real and effectual apprehension. In
the early parts of the Republic, Plato diagnoses for us the divided condi-
tion of Glaucon’s soul. Then he shows us how Socrates healed him, or at
least set him on the path toward healing.
Notes
- See, for example, Werner Jaeger, “Greek Medicine as Paideia,” in Paideia:
The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet, 3 vols. (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1944), 3:3. See also Werner Jaeger, “Aristotle’s Use of Medicine as
Model of Method in His Ethics,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 77, pt. 1 (1957): 54– 61.
See also John Haldane, “Medical Ethics—An Alternative Approach,” Journal of
Medical Ethics 12 (1986): 145– 50. See my Plato’s Dialogue Form and the Care of the