BERNARD FREYDBERGIsn’t this the way to think [dianoei`sqai] about the nature of anything?
First, it is necessary for us to consider whether the object regarding
which we would become experts [tecnikoi;] and capable of transmit-
ting our expertise is simple [aÔ ploun] or complex [polqeidev~]. Then,
if it is simple, we must investigate its power: What things does it have
what natural power of acting upon? By what things does it have what
natural disposition to be acted upon? If, on the other hand, it has
many forms [ei[dh], we must enumerate them all and, as we did in the
simple case, investigate how each is naturally able to act upon what
and how it has a natural disposition to be acted on by what. (Phaedrus
270c10– d7)But no one, of course, is in possession of either this knowledge of the
whole of the world or of the mevqodo~ by which one could acquire it. If
one were to claim that this method of determining the nature of things
is a scientifi c or systematic ideal of some kind, it is nevertheless clear
that Socrates makes no claim that he possesses it. Such a method yield-
ing such knowledge would surely be worth having, but this contradicts
Socratic ignorance. In the case of rhetoric, Socrates ridicules it in the
Gorgias, calling that so-called art that persuades by lovgo~—rhetoric—
not an art (tevcnh) but a “knack” (ejmpeiriva) and a “massage” (tribhv).^3
Thus, the conversation in the Phaedrus, which takes place under the
false supposition that there is such an art, has a striking effect upon
the mevqodo~ spoken of in its aforementioned context: this mevqodo~ lo-
cates itself on the outside of philosophy. This “only proper method,” a
method that would enable one to know the souls of others, would make
its possessor wise.
Examples of other casual uses of the word mevqodo~ can be found
at Phaedo 79d2– e5 and Theaetetus 183c2. In the former, Socrates asks
Cebes a question concerning the comparison of the soul and the body
with respect to their orientation toward “things that are of the same
kind.” By virtue of this orientation, “its experience then is what is called
wisdom.” Cebes answers, “I think, Socrates... that on this mevqodo~,
even the dullest would agree that the soul is altogether more like that
which always exists in the same state rather than like that which does
not.” In the latter, after a lengthy e“legco~ Socrates tells Theaetetus,
“We are not going to grant that knowledge is perception, not at any
rate on the methodos that supposes that all things are in motion” (Phaedo
183b9 – c2). In both the more robust of the casual uses above and the
more modest ones cited here, the Greek mevqodo~ and our word “pro-
cedure” seem synonymous, or at least close to being so.^4 But perhaps
this almost refl exive association is made too quickly. Perhaps there