BERNARD FREYDBERGtion. The entire line declares, in the dialogues, that two going together
can see better than one alone. This “seeing together,” I will strive to
show, applies not only to the dialogical interplay between interlocutors;
it applies also to the mutually nurturing relation between philosophy
and poetry.
In the Iliad, the passage “suvn te duv’ ercomevnw, kaiv te pro; o} tou'
e;novhsen” (“when two go together, one perceives before the other”) oc-
curs in the context of the nocturnal deliberations of the demoralized
Achaians, who were beaten back by Hector and the Trojans on the previ-
ous day.^6 Upon Nestor’s entreaty for someone to sneak into the camp of
the Trojans, either to capture one or to overhear their plans, “Diomedes
of the great war cry” volunteers at once, but adds:
But if some other man would go along with me
there would be more comfort in it, and greater confi dence.
When two go together, one of them at least looks forward
to see what is best; a man, by himself, though he be careful,
still has less mind [novo~] in him than two, and his wits [mh`ti~]
have less weight. (Iliad 10.222– 26)In Homer, then, “two going together” shows forth two virtues si-
multaneously: greater courage (that is, greater comfort and confi dence)
and greater insight. Interestingly, unlike ei\do~, which refers in Homer
only to outward appearance, nou'~ can suggest the perceived look of
something or can suggest the deliberating intellect.^7 The warriors’ jour-
ney turns out to be successful: Diomedes and Odysseus capture the Tro-
jan Dolon who, after supplying a wealth of information out of fear for
his life, is beheaded. Socrates will, of course, adapt this traditional (and
brutal) image for its philosophical yield.
Symposium 174 d 2– 3 reads: “Suvn te duv’, e[fh, ‘ejrcomevnw pro; ojdou’
bouleusovmeqa o{ti ejrou'men.” (“ ‘When two,’ he said, ‘going on the path
together, we can deliberate about what to say.’ ”)
Protagoras 348c7– 9 reads: “hJgou'mai ga;r pavnu levgein ti to;n ”Omhron
to;—suvn te duv’ ejrcomevnw, kai; te pro; o} ejnovhsen.” (“I think that Homer
said it all in the line—when two go together, one perceives before the
other.”)
In the Protagoras, the citation is an exact reproduction of book 10,
line 224, of the Iliad. The setting in the Protagoras in which the Homeric
passage occurs could not, it seems, be more different. The interplay be-
tween Socrates and Protagoras is tense. Protagoras neither wishes to be
the questioner nor the respondent in a question-and-answer exchange
on virtue with Socrates. Only when shamed by Alcibiades does he reluc-
tantly agree to be the respondent. Socrates declares his own confusion