Philosophy in Dialogue : Plato's Many Devices

HOMERIC Mevqodo~ IN PLATO’S SOCRATIC DIALOGUES

of e[rw~ as fi nite coheres with Aristophanes’ speech (as the latter was
quick to note; 212c5). And (3) the orientation of e[rw~ toward goodness
coheres with the speech of Agathon. The incorporation of the key ele-
ments of both poetic speeches in that of Socrates, together with the dis-
tancing of himself from the source of his inspiration just as do Homer,
Aristophanes, and Agathon, suggests that the two—poetry and philoso-
phy—go together and feed one another. One might say that the comic
traveling along the pathway by Aristodemus and Socrates that led to the
house of Agathon imaged the kindred and more fundamental “going
together” of philosophy and poetry that issued from the Symposium.

The Philosopher Splits the Poetic in Two

In one of the most telling but seldom cited passages in the Republic,
Socrates alludes signifi cantly to the “underlying sense” (uJpovnoia) be-
longing to poetry, a deeper sense that will play a major role in the life
of the philosopher. This uJpovnoia respects the divine inspiration of the
poet praised so unconditionally by Socrates in the Ion. There, he a ffi rms
that the poet in his “sane” state is quite ordinary, but under the sway of
divine madness has many true and useful things to convey to human-
kind.^10 The censorship of the poets spoken of in the building of the “city
in speech” issues from precisely such “sanity,” precisely such calculation.
The inspired person, in fact, is banned from this city, however wonder-
ful his or her inspiration proved to be.^11 Let us consider a discussion of
censorship and uJpovnoia in the Republic:

But Hera’s binding by her son, and Hephaestus’ being cast out by his

father who was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods Homer

made, must not be accepted in the city, whether they are made with an

underlying sense or without an underlying sense. A young thing can-

not judge what is an underlying sense and what is not. (378d3– 8)^12

The principle guiding the censorship of poetry in the city has only to do
with the shaping of the young souls of its guardians. As I have argued
elsewhere, this “principle” leads to features from the questionable to the
absurd.^13
For one, the young guardians-in-training are selected for their ca-
pacity to be vicious to others yet gentle to their own, a paraphrase of
Polemarchus’ earlier refuted notion of justice as helping one’s friends
and harming one’s enemies. For another, these most spirited youths are