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Of Psychic Maieutics
and Dialogical Bondage
in Plato’s Theaetetus
Benjamin J. Grazzini
Knowledge differs from right opinion by a bond.
Meno 98a8The conversation recounted in Plato’s Theaetetus, it seem s , a l mo st d id not
happen. Indeed, one might say that the conversation among Socrates,
Theodorus, and Theaetetus about what knowledge itself is almost mis-
carried. Despite the fact that he understands the sort of answer Socrates
is looking for—even despite the fact that he “cannot get rid of a feeling
of concern” (148e5– 6) about it—Theaetetus claims that he is not able
to say what knowledge is.^1 Socrates, however, does not give up so easily:
“You are in labor, my dear Theaetetus, not on account of being empty,
but pregnant” (148e7– 8). Socrates then accounts for his peculiar prac-
tice of philosophy in terms of psychic maieutics, that is, the midwifery
of the soul.^2 Theaetetus is pregnant with some conception concerning
knowledge; Socrates has the skills to bring Theaetetus’ offspring to
light, and to determine whether it is viable or an empty wind-egg. This
account suffi ces to reassure and encourage Theaetetus, who comes out
with: “As it now appears, knowledge is nothing other than perception”
(151e2– 3).
Socrates’ account of psychic maieutics initiates two overlapping
lines of thought. One is more limited to the Theaetetus and concerns the
relationship between the knowledge implied or assumed by Socrates’
claims to be a midwife of the soul, and the ensuing discussion of what
knowledge is. The other extends from the Theaetetus through the Soph-