OF PSYCHIC MAIEUTICS AND DIALOGICAL BONDAGE IN PLATO’S
THEAETETUSwhat Socrates and Theaetetus actually say and do. Just as there is no way
to rule out the possibility of Socrates learning about himself by serving
as psychic maieute, there is no way to guarantee that the relationship will
not become abusive.
This point seems to be acknowledged at least twice in the text.
The fi rst is the speech Socrates makes in the voice of, and on behalf
of, Protagoras (165e8– 168b5). Socrates here brings against himself two
charges. Insofar as Socrates seems to have been arguing against a carica-
ture of the Protagorean position, he has not done justice to the Protago-
rean hypothesis. “Whenever you examine something of mine through
questioning, if, answering as I would answer, the one being questioned
falls, then I am refuted—but if he answers otherwise, the one being
questioned is himself refuted” (166a8– b1). And insofar as Socrates ap-
pears to have taken advantage of Theaetetus’ youth and impressionable
character in order to frighten the boy into agreeing with him, Socrates
accuses himself of corrupting this youth (166a2– 6).^34
The other moment that is crucial in this respect, and indeed, de-
cisive for the conversation as a whole, is when Socrates defers the dis-
cussion of Parmenides that should have followed the discussion of the
Protagorean-Heraclitean position (183b7– 184b1). Two aspects of this
moment are particularly signifi cant. On the one hand, it is an indication
of how Theaetetus understands the relationship to which he is bound.
Theaetetus challenges Theodorus and Socrates to follow through on
their proposal to examine fi rst “the fl owing ones,” that is, those who
say that everything is in motion, and then “the partisans of the whole,”
that is, the Eleatics (181a4– b1).^35 He thus appears to place more weight
on the bond between the interlocutors and their shared inquiry than
on the bond among the interlocutors themselves. Socrates defers this
responsibility, however, because he is afraid that he will not understand
what Parmenides said, let alone meant, and because to take seriously
the words of old father Parmenides would “take so long as to do away
with the discussion of knowledge” (184a8– 9). For the sake of Theaete-
tus and Theaetetus’ pregnancy, then, Socrates puts aside the issues that
have been rising up like a fl ood since they broached the question of
knowledge—issues of motion and rest, the political issues surrounding
Socrates’ trial, and his relationship to the philosophical tradition he
inherits.
Socrates, no less than Theaetetus, is bound to the task of saying
what knowledge itself is. In the fi rst place, if Socrates is to make good
on his account of psychic maieutics, he must see Theaetetus’ pregnancy
and birth through to the end. And if Socrates is to learn anything
about himself by looking at Theaetetus, he is bound to their shared