PLATO’S DIFFERENT DEVICEtone in 1865 by writing, “It is neither clear, nor orderly, nor comparable
in animation to the expository books of the Republic.... Every commen-
tator of Plato, from Galen onwards, has complained of the obscurity
of the Philebus.”^7 Robert Bury concurred in 1897 by characterizing the
Philebus as “harsh and rugged in style” and likening it to “a gnarled and
knotted old oak tree.”^8 Crombie calls it “obscure” and “a very precari-
ous dialogue to interpret,”^9 while Gadamer notes the “famous problem”
of its diffi cult transitions.^10 Guthrie comments that it is “on the whole
lacking in dramatic interest” and calls it “a ‘weary’ dialogue” that tries
readers with its “untidiness” and unclarity.^11 Davidson goes so far as to
call it “one of Plato’s oddest dialogues.”^12
However, the Philebus has always had its share of admirers. In the
fi fteenth century, Marsilio Ficino praised the dialogue as nothing less
than “Plato’s book on man’s highest good,” and had it read to his patron
Cosimo de Medici on his deathbed.^13 In the nineteenth century, Schlei-
ermacher wrote: “From the earliest times to the present, the Philebus has
been regarded as one of the most important of the works of Plato, and
also, as one of the most diffi cult.”^14 More recently, Cynthia Hampton has
defended Plato against charges of obscurity here by asserting “there is
method in his (apparent) madness”;^15 she also fi nds in this work a model
of non- dichotomous thinking of great interest to current feminist think-
ers.^16 Rosemary Desjardins goes so far as to call the Philebus “one of the
most exhilarating... and important of Plato’s dialogues.”^17
I acknowledge both sides of the debate: the Philebus is indeed often
frustratingly dense and obscure. It lacks the wit and the dramatic force
of many other dialogues. As readers we often feel lost in the twists and
turns of the argument. But the Philebus has an often overlooked discur-
sive strength, which lies in its determinant way of addressing plurality.
This feature enacts the new methods and demonstrates the benefi ts of
dialectical revision and stylistic repetition (as distinguished from mere
repetitiveness), which together make possible the reconciliation between
the one and the many, the limit and the unlimited. While many prob-
lems remain, the dialogue is not as hopelessly disjointed as it may at fi rst
appear. By paying attention to the dialogue form itself, the movements
back and forth of the conversation, we allow the form and the content to
illuminate each other. A close reading of the opening sections foreshad-
ows the challenges and methods of the whole, highlights the contrasts
with the Parmenides, and suggests connections with Aristotle.
From the start, the language of the Parmenides lacks a certain de-
terminacy: no one questions or further defi nes Zeno’s opening hypoth-
esis that if things are many, they must be both like and unlike (127e).
Socrates, whom Plato here presents as young and naive, quickly sees