PLATO’S DIFFERENT DEVICEharmonious by imposing a defi nite number [ajriqmov~] on them” (25e).^39
For example, a temperature described simply as “too hot” or “too cold”
remains indeterminate until we measure a distinct degree that imposes
a limit on it. The mixed class is praised as producing harmony in every-
thing from good climate to good character, while the cause of order and
cycles in the universe “has every right to the title of wisdom and reason”
(30c7).
The successfully blended life itself repeats the fourfold scheme, es-
pecially of course the newly elevated category of the mixture. Gadamer
holds that the theory of the four kinds provides the ontological ground
for the good life as mixed: “Only when the mixture is no longer thought
of as a diminution and clouding of the pure, true, and unmixed, but
as a genus of its own” can the mixed category, in the cosmos or in the
soul, be seen as the good (Idea of the Good, 113). This mixture provides
a middle way between “is” and “is not,” namely, the realm of becoming.
Plato has Socrates describe this third class with the important phrase,
gevnesin eij~ oujsivan (26d8).^40 Being and becoming must themselves be
blended with measure. The new methods lead to a new understanding
of both ontology and ethics. As Günter Figal summarizes:
The Good is the unity of pevra`~ and a[peirovn. This unity can only be
the fortunate coincidence of the two principles in which form retains
its harmonious proportions in the midst of becoming, and the ephem-
eral nature of becoming comes to anchor in form (94).^41Intelligence, as the cause of the mixture, grants the proportion that the
mixture needs to become stable. The new discursive methods of recon-
ciling the one and the many allow the mixed class, and the mixed life,
to come into focus as the good.
Despite the more fl exible language, there are still many diffi cult
moments in the complex arguments. The different senses of pleasure
are not always clear, as for instance when Socrates switches between
Philebus’ coarse physical pleasures and those of learning. We have not,
of course, delved into the detailed analyses of pleasure and pain, or true
and false pleasures. Yet even after recognizing the problems, we still may
conclude that the method of repetition contributes to the reconciliation
that the dialogue eventually achieves. As Socrates reminds us just before
the mixing of thought and pleasure, “the proverb fi ts well here that says
that good things deserve repeating ‘twice or even thrice’” (60a).^42 The
speakers repeat not only phrases but equally methods, enacting both
the divine gift of classifi cation and the fourfold ontological scheme. In
this way all the many different kinds of pleasure—true and false, intel-