Philosophy in Dialogue : Plato's Many Devices

CHRISTOPHER P. LONG

This would have the effect of placing him and Socrates equidistant from
the most beautiful man at the party, the man whose name evokes the
good itself. Alcibiades’ hubris drives his proposal, for he believes him-
self justifi ed in claiming equal access to the good with Socrates. To this
Socrates responds: “But that is impossible” (222e). And although the
reason Socrates explicitly gives for this is that it would mean that Ag-
athon would have to praise him again, the deeper implication is that
Alcibiades, having rejected philosophy and turned to popular politics,
is unprepared for such close proximity to the good. In contrast to Alcibi-
ades’ proposal, Socrates suggests that Agathon recline on the other side
of him, thus setting up the following positions:

Alcibiades Socrates Agathon

Here Socrates would not only have to praise Agathon, but also, like
Eros himself, he would be situated between the human and the divine,
between the politician addicted to the unhealthy eros associated with
narcissistic popularity and the divinely inspired, beautiful tragic poet.
Yet even this confi guration is not actualized in the dialogue; for just as
Agathon moves to recline by Socrates, a crowd of revelers interrupts
him and the party descends into erotic chaos. The anarchy of human
eros literally disrupts Socrates’ attempt to establish a fi xed relationship
with the good and to situate himself fi rmly between it and the political
(223b). Once the chaos subsides and the upsurge of erotic energy gives
way to the peaceful predawn rising of the morning light, a new constel-
lation emerges:

Agathon Aristophanes Socrates

After the others have gone home, these three remain “drinking from a
large bowl, from left to r ight” w ith Socrates tr y ing to conv ince them that
the same person could write both tragedy and comedy (223c).^23 Here
Aristophanes replaces Socrates as the mediating fi gure, and the comic
recognition of human fi nitude is made to stand between Socrates and
the good. If Agathon symbolizes not only the good itself, but also the
very search for wholeness expressed in tragic poetry, the seating order
would then show what Plato himself cannot explicitly say: seek the good,
but beware of the delusion that you possess it. The erotic search for the
good that animates human life must always be tempered by a humble,
indeed a comic, recognition of human fi nitude. The darkness of this
latter recognition gives way at the end of the dialogue to the hope that
perhaps even through comedy something of the good may be weaved
into the fabric of human community.