JILL GORDONform of an image. Simmias likens the soul to a harmony and the body
to a lyre, asking whether the soul might be destroyed with the body just
as the harmony is destroyed along with the lyre (85e– 86d). Cebes uses
the image of the old weaver and his cloak, which is left behind after the
weaver’s death. Cebes claims that even though the weaver has had many
cloaks prior to this last one, we cannot infer by its existence that the
weaver, the longer lasting of the two, is still alive because the cloak still
exists (87b– 88b). Plato draws our attention to the self-conscious use of
images when he has Cebes say that, like Simmias, he too is in need of
an image in order to express his objection (87b; eijkovno~ gavr tino~, wJ~
e[oiken, kajgw; w{sper Simmiva~ devomai). T he Phaedo thus indicates that im-
ages can play a role in posing formidable philosophical questions.
Just as Simmias faced asking diffi cult questions, so now Socrates
faces answering diffi cult questions, and the Phaedo recommends phi-
losophy as the courageous choice in both cases. In fact, Socrates must
assuage some of the anxiety of those who now fear that philosophy is
not a match to meet these formidable objections.^7 Socrates’ cure for the
anxiety of the interlocutors amounts to an admonition never to tire of
the pursuit of an argument and, furthermore, when philosophy fails,
never to blame the argument, but to see the failing in ourselves. We
must not become misologists, haters of argument, but we must maintain
trust in philosophical argument, even when it seems to betray us (89c–
91a). One might object that Socrates is saying exactly the opposite of
what I want to establish, since he claims that our faith ought to remain
in argument. Socrates’ view, however, implies that arguments will neces-
sarily fail us. What comes through strongly in these passages is again the
fundamental limitation of human beings. Despite the occasional failure
of argument, we ought not let that deter us from the life of philosophy.
Socrates’ cure for anxiety, while assuring us that we ought to remain
faithful to philosophy, at the same time warns us of our limitations.
And while the participants in this dialogue look to philosophy for
preservation in the seas of uncertainty, philosophy is not, as it is prac-
ticed in the Phaedo, pure argumentation, nor an appeal to reason, sepa-
rate from other faculties. Near the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates
describes his discussion of the soul and the afterlife as telling stories
(muqologei`n, 61e), and he prefaces his defense that he is right not to
grieve at death by saying that he hopes (ejlpivzw) to go to a good fate,
“though I should not dare to assert this positively; but I would assert as
positively as anything about such matters that I am going to gods who
are good masters” (63c). The entire setup for Socrates’ views on the im-
mortality of the soul is therefore couched in non-conclusive, speculative
terms. And after having presented his views on the immortality of the