Philosophy in Dialogue : Plato's Many Devices

JILL GORDON

Notes

1. This essay is taken from chapter 6 of my book, Turning Toward Philosophy:
   Literary Device and Dramatic Structure in Plato’s Dialogues (University Park: Penn-
   sylvania State University Press, 1999). Unless noted otherwise, I use the transla-
   tions from the Loeb Classical Library.


2. There are many ways to think of images. As the few brief examples cited
   in the opening paragraph indicate, some images in the dialogues are what we
   call metaphors; some are more properly considered analogies; and some are
   woven into the fabric of what we consider myths or allegories. In addition, some
   are what we might call “fi ctional” stories, and in some cases these images take
   the form of plastic artifacts. The Platonic texts support the grouping of these
   various instances under the single heading “image” insofar as these several de-
   vices are referred to as eijkwvn throughout the corpus and denote likenesses of
   one kind or another. Plato’s language surrounding the use of images includes,
   as well, various cognates of “image” such as ei[dwlon and eijkasiva. I hope to
   point to a link between images and the role of vision in Platonic metaphys-
   ics by drawing attention to the further connection to “that which is seen” and
   “form” (ei\do~). The semantic correlate to “image” would be paravdeigma—the
   pattern or model after which a likeness may be produced. I will cite the Greek
   terms being used in the many examples that follow in order to underscore the
   unity of the semantic fi eld in which these terms are placed by Plato. There are
   even further links when one considers the term “mimesis” (mivmhsi~), which de-
   scribes the relationship between an image and its original, between eijkwvn and
   paravdeigma.


3. For dialogues that are plausible sources for this view, see, for example,
   Phaedo 65a– 67b, 79a; Republic 509c– 511e, 514a– 518b, 597e– 603b; Sophist 234b–
   236e, 264c– 266e.


4. While I have chosen to focus on images and the visual aspects of the dia-
   logues, some of the conclusions at which I arrive could apply to the senses more
   generally and their role in the Platonic corpus. For example, it can be argued
   that the aural is also central to Socratic interactions, that “hearing” is central
   to teaching and it makes the “seeing” of images possible. Hence one might pro-
   ceed caut iously in pr iv ileg ing seeing or t he sense of sight. I a m indebted to G ar y
   Alan Scott for bringing this important point to my attention.


5. Fowler translates this phrase as “equality in the abstract.” I prefer the
   more literal translation “equality itself” for my purposes here.


6. Both Socrates and Plato are confronted with the task of urging others
   to engage in philosophical inquiry when there is a risk that in this life we might
   not fi nd answers to our deepest questions.


7. I have omitted a discussion here of the role of fear in the Phaedo and
   the dramatic shift from the jail cell back to the framing conversation between
   Phaedo and Echecrates, which occurs just at the point in the dialogue when
   that fear over the possible failure of philosophy is most palpable (88c– 89b).
   These are discussed in detail in Turning Toward Philosophy.


8. Gadamer makes a similar case regarding the consistent message in the