NICHOLAS D. SMITHof dialectic could achieve. Plato’s Socrates is not doing mathematics, of
course; but he is using images in a way that engages knowledge.
But why, then, does Socrates disclaim knowledge, if I am right in
claiming that the way in which he constructs his arguments employs it?
The answer to this question, I contend, may be found in the same dis-
tinction that we fi nd Socrates making in regard to the mathematicians,
who employ the cognitive power of knowledge, but whose method fails
to realize the most signifi cant effects of that power, because of its reli-
ance on images and on unexplained hypotheses. Let us see exactly how
Socrates characterizes his own epistemic condition. At 506b2, Glaucon
and Socrates have reached an agreement that the rulers of the city they
are imagining must know the Good. Now Glaucon presses Socrates to
give his own view of what the Good is, but Socrates demurs:
“What then,” I said, “do you think it is just to speak as having knowl-
edge about things one does not know?”
“Not at all,” he said, “as having knowledge, but one should be will-
ing to speak as his conception what he conceives.”
“What? Haven’t you observed that beliefs without knowledge are all
ugly? The best of these are blind; or do you believe that those who have
some true belief without intelligence are much different from blind
people who go the right way?”
“Not at all.”
“Do you wish, then, to witness ugly, blind, and crooked things, when
you might hear from others what is luminous and fi ne?” (506c2– d1)But of course, Socrates is here presenting Glaucon with a false
alternative, and the young man seems to sense as much, for despite
Socrates’ very negative characterization of the products of mere belief,
Glaucon urges Socrates nonetheless to continue his discussion “just
as you did with justice, self-control, and the other virtues” (506d3– 5).
Glaucon, in other words, is not merely asking Socrates for his opinion;
Glaucon takes Socrates all along not to have been stating “beliefs without
knowledge,” while also accepting that Socrates has not been speaking as
“having knowledge” or even as proposing “some true beliefs without in-
telligence.” Glaucon takes Socrates to be somewhere between these two
conditions, and because Socrates responds to Glaucon’s plea by continu-
ing (with the image of the sun), we may assume that Socrates also re-
gards himself as not merely serving up beliefs that are “ugly, blind, and
crooked.” His own epistemic condition, then, is one in which the power
of knowledge has been engaged, but—as he employs images and makes
assumptions in his attempt to gain a better grasp of truth—his own use