PHIL HOPKINSSparta at the vote to go to war (1.122); and Pericles, in his speech to the Athe-
nians after the Spartan embassy (1.140). Thucydides foreshadows the mistakes
that do indeed contribute to the Athenian loss fairly early in book 1 (1.69),
where, in the fi rst Corinthian address to Sparta, Corinth maintains that it was
Persian mistakes that cost Persia the war and that their own success with Athens
thus far was due mainly to Athenian blunders. That Corinth does so in the
very speech that lays out the Athenian strength of character serves also to call
into question the value of the Corinthian assessment for a prognosis of victory.
Pericles also augurs the outcome when he states that he is much more afraid
of Athenian mistakes than of Spartan schemes and plans (1.144), but he does
so in the very speech in which he eloquently calls the Athenians to prepare for
and welcome war.
- See, for example, Gorgias, The Apology of Palamedes; Aristotle, Rhetoric
2.24.11; and Aristophanes, Clouds 889– 1104. Thucydides’ sophistic training
would have included recognizing and utilizing eijkov~ reasoning. - See, for example, Euthydemus 305– 7, Phaedrus 272– 74, and Gorgias 462–
- However, in those cases where the matter being investigated is so abstract or
complex as to make the truth diffi cult or even impossible to attain, or pertains
to divine matters, even Socrates resorts to eijkov~ reasoning, and does so explic-
itly as the best method available under the circumstances. See Phaedrus 246a,
Republic 506ff, and Timaeus (in particular 29b– d, 44c– d, 48d, and 72d). - Phaedo 85d.
- The failure also in this case allows the reader to see that Charmides
does not in fact possess swfrosuvnh, given the relation of swfrosuvnh with
knowledge established later in the dialogue. If swfrosuvnh is related to knowl-
edge, and knowledge is knowledge of opposites, as is suggested at the end of the
dialog ue, t hen t he ver y part ialit y of Char mides’ answer is an indict ment against
his possession of the virtue. - Perhaps the clearest expression of this insight is to be found in the
Phaedrus (270c), where Socrates asks, “Do you think one would be able to un-
derstand worthily the nature of the soul from the logos without understand-
ing the nature of the whole?” Also in the Phaedrus (249b – c; see also 259e and
260e), Socrates remarks that “human souls must understand a logos according
to a Form, moving from many perceptions to a unity which has been brought
together by means of reason [logismov~].” See also Laws 965c. - In the Meno, Socrates is careful to argue both for the hypothesis and
against the hypothesis that virtue is teachable, even though the positive argu-
ment appears convincing to Meno. In the Phaedo as well, Simmias and Cebes
participate both negatively and positively in the examination of the hypotheses.
Socrates, although arguing for the positive position for the most part with re-
spect to the Forms, and also for the immortality of the soul which is connected
to the hypothesis of the Forms, reminds us at the end that his logos has not con-
vinced him of the truth of his hypotheses. In the Parmenides (135b – c), after sug-
gesting that the power of dialectic depends upon distinguishing Forms for each
of the things that are, Socrates is led on a journey through possible hypotheses
concerning ideas that turn up again in the Sophist as the “Great Kinds.” There