MARK MOESogy between the relations of cells/humors/organs to larger organisms,
on the one hand, and the relations of citizens to the body politic, on the
other, will bias the theorist of the organic povli~ toward devaluing indi-
vidual liberty and self-governance. Instead, he comes out with a vision of
the self-governing and free individual citizen.^37 So at 405b1– 3 Socrates
suggests to Glaucon that it is shameful and a great sign of vulgarity “to
be forced to use a justice imposed by others, as masters and judges.”^38
Plato’s Socrates seems to be, then, a “non-libertarian liberal” concerned
about the (conceptual and not just practical) impossibility of imposing
virtue upon other souls through legislation and police enforcement.^39
The Third ProposalGlaucon’s political ambition and unrealistic estimate of his own virtu-
ousness dispose him to think of himself not only as a capable legislator
but also as a capable judge or interpreter of the law. He suggests to
Socrates that the best judges (dikavstai) are those who are “streetwise,”
those who have associated with people whose natures are of every kind,
just as the best doctors are those who have handled the greatest number
of cases of persons sick and healthy (408c5– d3). Socrates responds with
his third proposal (408d4– 409e2). It is that judges in the povli~ ought to
be persons of good character with unsullied backgrounds, persons who
have lived righteous lives. It may be true that being a good physician
does not depend upon good physical health, and the cleverest doctors
may be those who from youth have had most experience with sickness
in themselves and others. Nevertheless, the best judges are those who
from youth have had least association and experience with bad charac-
ters and have avoided indulgence in any injustice and so kept their souls
healthy. It isn’t possible for a soul that has been nurtured (teqravfqai)
among vicious souls from childhood on and has committed every kind
of injustice to come through this as an astute (ojxevw~) judge of other
people’s injustices (409a1– 5). If someone is to be able to judge soundly
(krinein uJgiw~) concerning justice and injustice, he must himself be
inexperienced and guileless (a[peirovn kai; ajkevraion) while he is young
(4 0 9 a 5 – 7). It is true that decent and fair people (ejpieikei`~), when t hey
are young, appear simple and guileless (eujhvqei~) and are easily deceived
by the unjust, because they have in themselves no experiences like those
of the vicious to serve as models (paradeivgmata) to guide their judg-
ments. In the long run this is no disadvantage, however, for they turn
out to be the best judges of character. They learn about injustice late
in life after having trained themselves (memelethkovta) over a long pe-
riod to recognize (diaisqavnesqai) what sort of thing evil is by nature,