Jesse Prinz (2011, 2012) advocates what he calls the Attended Intermediate Representation
(hereafter ‘AIR’) theory of consciousness. To understand Prinz’s view, it is easiest to begin with
the overall method he employs to deliver a theory. He attempts first to answer the question
of where in the processing of information in the brain that consciousness arises. The focus on
‘intermediate’ gives away the answer to this question; he emphasizes the intermediate level of
processing as the locus of consciousness. It is representations at this intermediate level that con-
stitute the content of conscious experiences. Once one knows where the conscious states pop
up in the processing, one can then employ a further method shared by psychologists and neu-
roscientists: compare cases where these intermediate level activations occur with and without
consciousness, then look for differences elsewhere that could be responsible for the variation
in consciousness. Here the ‘attention’ part of the theory comes to the fore. Prinz contends that
a major reason why intermediate level activations can occur without consciousness is that sub-
jects with these activations lack attention. Two subjects can thus process the same information
through intermediate areas, but, if one attends to the stimuli responsible for those activations and
the other does not, only the former will be conscious of those stimuli. Conjoin the two parts
and you have the overall view: conscious states are AIRs.
In this entry, I will review the impressive evidence Prinz presents for his theory, explaining
both the arguments he makes for the locus of conscious states in brain processing and also the
role of attention in making those states conscious. Most of this evidence concerns what can
be called the ‘psychological correlates of consciousness,’ since the evidence concerns attention,
representations, and information processing, which are all psychological notions. Prinz (2013)
also offers a theory about the neural implementation of the psychological correlates. Given
the speculative nature of this part of Prinz’s view, however, I will focus here exclusively on the
psychological side of his view. Finally, after laying out Prinz’s view and the evidence he cites in
favor of it, I will offer a critical voice about his theory.1 Where Does Consciousness Arise in Neural Processing?
Let us begin with the question of where consciousness arises. What is the ‘intermediate’ level,
what are these ‘intermediate representations’? The most intensely studied sense modality is
vision, so it is easiest to answer to these questions by looking at what we know about vision.12
THE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL
THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
David Barrett
David Barrett Intermediate Level Theory of Consciousness