Antti Revonsuophenomenal organization in the brain, a level of spatially unified qualitative subjectivity. This
level is constituted by concrete physical (perhaps complex neuroelectrical) phenomena, located
in and unfolding across the physical space and time inside the brain. Consciousness is not built
out of abstract entities or second-order properties such as computations, algorithms, or infor-
mation. For unified qualitative subjectivity to emerge, the highly specific biological conditions
inside the brain are required. Consciousness is not likely to be found in physical systems com-
pletely unlike the brain. As a higher-level physical phenomenon, consciousness possesses causal
powers of its own, manifested in consciously guided behaviors.
Compared to the large extent of their shared ground, the differences between BN and BR
are only minor. One difference however is that BN appears to not acknowledge the challenges
of the Explanatory Gap and the Hard Problem. BR by contrast takes them to be serious but not
insurmountable anomalies for the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness (Revonsuo 2015).
Other philosophers who have recently defended a position close to BR include O’Brien
and Opie (2015). They argue that conscious experiences are emergent physical structures just
like molecules and cells, and thereby the biological approach avoids two mortal pitfalls that have
long plagued the philosophy of mind. Firstly, they avoid the reductionistic pitfall that leads to
microphysicalism (the belief that only the bottom level of elementary physics really exists and
everything, including consciousness, reduces to that level). Secondly, they avoid the functionalist,
information-theoretic, computationalist pitfall that identifies consciousness with second-order
abstract entities that have no causal powers of their own in the physical world (epiphenomenal-
ism) and the implausible idea that consciousness can exist or be realized in nearly all physical
systems (panpsychism).
Biological Naturalism and Biological Realism place consciousness where it belongs: As a
real higher-level physical phenomenon in the brain, with special features and causal powers of
its own, just like any other higher level biological phenomena. The biological approach avoids
falling into the traps of epiphenomenalism and panpsychism, but must face the Explanatory Gap
and the Hard Problem. BN and BR remain optimistic that understanding consciousness as a
biological phenomenon will in the future close the gap between subjective consciousness and
objective brain activity.
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