The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness

Consciousness, Time, and Memory

that (perceptual) memory states must have contents, which have previously figured in perceptual
awareness.
In earlier work I have suggested, following Martin (2001), that the fundamental unifying
feature common to all forms of memory is that they are all ways of preserving past psychologi-
cal success. Secondary memory or recollection is plausibly thought of as the preservation of
past apprehension or acquaintance (or more precisely, the preservation of an associated ability).
Primary memory, however, is, in James’ words “not thus brought back; it never was lost; its date
was never cut off in consciousness from that of the immediately present moment. ... it comes
to us as belonging to the rearward portion of the present space of time, and not to the genuine
past” (1890: 646–647). Consider awareness of two notes do and re. Suppose one hears re in a dif-
ferent manner depending on whether one hears it as part of a succession or not. We might then
suppose that hearing re involves primary memory insofar as it involves hearing re in a particular
way, namely as succeeding on from do. This modification of one’s manner of awareness plausibly
counts as a form in which a psychological success (namely awareness of do) can be preserved.
Moreover, in itself, it does not commit us to the idea that do is presented as past as opposed
simply to re being heard as succeeding on from do.
Reconstructing his argument, it may nonetheless seem that Lee is right to find an inconsistency
between the following three claims:

i Temporal experience essentially involves memory.
ii Memory essentially involves the preservation of past psychological success.
iii Temporal experience can occur independently of the preservation of past psychological
success.

In the above example, for example, it would surely be problematic to claim that an awareness of
re as succeeding on from do counted as a form of memory if do had never been heard. However,
the tension might seem to be straight-forwardly resolved by weakening claim (i) to read: tempo-
ral experience essentially involves memory or apparent memory. This weakened claim is arguably
sufficient to constitute a genuine memory theory, and might seem capable of accommodating
the kind of case which Lee has in mind where one has an experience with temporal extended
contents despite no such contents appearing in any earlier experience. For all Lee says, then,
there are grounds for thinking that some form of memory is involved in all variants of the class
of models that Dainton calls retentional.
Lee’s discussion raises an interesting question, however, namely whether we should in fact
admit the possibility (as Lee does) of courses of experience where one set of extended contents
bears no relation to previous experiential contents. As I now discuss, this possibility is precisely
rejected by Husserl in his own discussion of primary memory. Its exploration serves to raise
a doubt about the distinctness of retentional and extensional accounts. It also reveals what is,
I suggest, fundamentally at issue between different theorists of temporal awareness.

4 Retention and Prior Awareness

In discussing primary memory, a dominant concern of Husserl’s is to distinguish primary mem-
ory from any form of weak or faded perception.

The reverberation of a violin tone is precisely a feeble present violin tone and is abso-

lutely different from the retention of the loud tone that has just passed. The echoing

itself and after-images of any sort left behind by the stronger data of sensation, far from