Shaun Gallagherbe measured in a .5- to 5-second duration; in the phenomenological tradition it is explicated in
terms of the intrinsic temporal (retentional-protentional) structure of consciousness (Gallagher
1998; Gallagher and Zahavi 2012). Roughly, anything above that time scale is regarded as involv-
ing reflective consciousness, recollection and the possibility of narrative description.
Clearly, the time scales related to consciousness are the integrative and narrative ones.
Consciousness prior to action falls on either the narrative time scale in the form of deliberation
and distal intention formation (see, e.g., Velleman 2005) or the integrative time scale in the form
of the activity that may be involved in our first example of preparing tea. I don’t have to formulate
a large narrative about making tea; I don’t usually engage in the formation of prior intentions
about making myself a cup of tea. Planning a tea party would involve such narrative-level pro-
cesses, however. Consciousness during action falls primarily on the integrative time scale, since my
awareness of what I am doing falls within the immediacy of the ongoing action. Here, however,
we see some issues pertaining to the individuation of action. Cleaning up after the tea party might
be regarded as one action composed of a set of simpler actions, and any of them might extend
beyond the upper limits of a specious present. Some actions, accordingly, extend into the narrative
time scale. Still, as I am conscious of such an action during the action, my immediate first-order
(e.g., perceptual) consciousness extends only across the seconds of the specious present (involving
working memory but not recollection) before it requires the enaction of a new and different kind
of consciousness, i.e. episodic memory, to hold onto previous parts or elements of the action. More
generally, second-order, reflective consciousness involves the narrative time scale. In this respect,
consciousness after action tends to be framed on this time scale.
On the narrative time scale, I can retrospectively reflect, attribute, and report on my actions.
On this time scale, I can evaluate and give reasons for my actions. None of this changes the
physical nature of my actions, although such procedures can change the interpretation or the
meaning of my actions. This is an important consideration, however, since what my actions
mean, to me or to others, is in some sense part of what my actions are.
In a relatively simple action, such as preparing tea, there may not be much to interpret or
evaluate. Yet, if I consistently prepare my tea in such a way that I make a mess that others have
to live with; or if I consistently invite my wife to join me for a cup of tea; or if I consistently
fail to invite my wife to join me for a cup of tea, etc., becoming conscious of my past actions,
perhaps in conversation with my wife, may make my actions something different than what I
or others considered them to be. Physically, one might say, they are what they are. But actions
are certainly more than what they physically are. What a particular action is, depends on what
that action means. We’ve known this at least since the time Socrates explained his disappoint-
ment with Anaxagoras in Plato’s Phaedo. Sequencing through a series of physical movements
does not make an action what it is. Rather, what an action means in a particular pragmatic or
social context determines what it is, and this is what a narrative consciousness captures in any
giving of account. A purely physical, or even neurophysiological, description tells us nothing
about what the action is, even if it explains how it might be possible. What an action is depends
in a real sense on context (or intentionality), the agent’s intention, and how the agent and others
interpret the action.
One finds clear examples of such complications in legal contexts. A physical description of
the action by itself does not determine whether the action is one of homicide, manslaughter, or
accident. Arguably, what an action is is determined by the agent’s conscious intention prior to
and during the action, and sometimes by retrospective judgments made after the action. All of
these factors have to do with consciousness – consciousness before, during, and after action. Take
away consciousness at any of these points and what we consider to be an action may no longer
be an action, or may be a different sort of action than an action that involves consciousness.