Consciousness and PsychopathologyFor other recent philosophical discussion on the unity of consciousness, see Tye (2003, chapter 5),
Cleeremans (2003), Dainton (2008), and Bayne (2008, 2010, chapter 9).
4 Lane (2015) replies not only to Gennaro and Billon and Kriegel, but also clarifies and further develops
some of his influential previous work in this area.
5 Radden (2010) and Pliushch and Metzinger (2015). There are also numerous other very strange delu-
sions discussed in the literature, such as Cotard syndrome, which is a rare neuropsychiatric disorder in
which people hold a delusional belief that they are dead (either figuratively or literally), do not exist, are
putrefying, or have lost their blood or internal organs; Capgras syndrome, which is a disorder in which a
person holds a delusion that a friend, spouse, parent, or other close family member has been replaced
by an identical-looking impostor; and Fregoli Delusion, the belief that various people met by the deluded
subject are actually the same person in disguise.
6 See also Frith (1992), Sabanz and Prinz (2006), Bortolotti and Broome (2009), Parnas and Sass (2011),
and Graham (2013: 254–261).
7 There is also a disorder called “body integrity identity disorder” (BIID) whereby an individual has the
desire to amputate one or more healthy limbs (First and Fisher 2012). It is not clear what causes BIID,
but it may be due to an abnormality of not including the limb in the brain’s “body map,” located in the
right parietal lobe. Ethical issues also arise about whether or not the patient should be able to have a
limb amputated (Ryan 2009; Muller 2009).
8 For more on various psychopathologies, see Radden (2004), Hirstein (2005), Bortolotti (2009), Bayne
and Fernandez (2009), Bayne (2010), Feinberg (2011), Graham (2013), and Gennaro (2015a). See also
McGeer (2004) on autism and self-awareness.
9 For more on consciousness and free will, see Baumeister, Mele, and Vohs (2010) and Caruso (2012).
10 Some philosophers believe that moral responsibility (and free will for that matter) more generally
requires consciousness of at least some kind. Given the close connection between acting freely and
making conscious decisions, it is not surprising that one might, in turn, hold that consciousness is nec-
essary for moral responsibility as well. Levy (2014), for example, defends what he calls the conscious-
ness thesis, that is, “consciousness of some of the facts that give our actions their moral significance is a
necessary condition for moral responsibility” (Levy 2014: 1). For much more on this theme, see Caruso
“Consciousness, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility,” this volume. For an example of the opposing
view, see Sher (2009).
11 For more on mental illness and philosophy of psychiatry, see Fulford, Thornton, and Graham (2006),
Graham (2013), Zachar (2014), and Kincaid and Sullivan (2014).
12 Journals such as Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, Psychopathology, and
NeuroEthics have also helped to foster interdisciplinary work on psychopathologies and mental ill-
ness. In addition to MIT Press’s Philosophical Psychopathology book series, Oxford University Press’s
International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry series and the Oxford Series in Neuroscience, Law, and
Philosophy are invaluable.
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