Except in our most skeptical moods, it is hard for us philosophers to doubt the successes of
science. Reflection on its achievements over the last 50 years alone is cause for optimism (e.g.,
the sequencing of the human genome, the development of a rich understanding of the archi-
tecture of human memory, and the discovery that the universe is rapidly expanding at an ever-
increasing rate). It seems that science is quite good at achieving its epistemic ends—its goals with
respect to the likes of knowledge, understanding, and explanation. But if we had to settle on one
word that best represents the limits of science, at least as currently practiced, we could hardly do
better than the one that unites this volume: consciousness.
But not all forms of consciousness are equally intractable. The one that has struck many as
particularly resistant to our best theorizing is phenomenal consciousness. This is the form exhib-
ited by mental states that have a subjective, qualitative, or experiential aspect to them. There is
“something it is like” to be in them (Nagel 1974). At a minimum, these phenomenal states include
perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, felt emotions, and felt moods (Tye 2016). So, think
about the experience of sucking on a lemon, the sensation of stubbing your toe, and the elation
of a hard-won A, and you’ll have a pretty good idea of the type of mental state and form of
consciousness that has seemed so puzzling to so many.
Just as we may note that some forms of consciousness seem more intractable than others,
we may also note that some puzzles about phenomenal consciousness seem more puzzling than
others. Certain “how” or “why” questions seem particularly perplexing. Here is how Chalmers
(1995: 201) puts the mystery:The really hard problem is the problem of experience... Why is it that when our cogni-
tive systems engage in visual and auditory information processing, we have visual or
auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we
explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image or to experience
an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we
have no good explanation of why and how it so arises.This quote captures what Chalmers calls “the hard problem of consciousness.” It contrasts with
what he deems to be the easier problems. These are problems primarily having to do with how
the mind/brain accesses and deploys information. For instance, what underwrites our capacity34
CONSCIOUSNESS AND
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
Chad Gonnerman
Chad Gonnerman Consciousness and Experimental Philosophy