MaterialismRosenthal 1986; Gennaro 2004)? And which relations make mental states conscious states of
particular types, e.g. experiences of red versus experiences of green? Moreover, perceptual expe-
riences seem to represent items in the world: is this to be taken at face value, and if so, can there
be an adequate materialistic account of what it is for a mental state to represent some object
or property that allows for illusion and hallucination? These are just some of the questions that
need to be answered to provide an adequate theory of conscious mental states, and therefore,
even for those who believe that there are good grounds for embracing Materialism, there is still
a lot of work to be done.
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