sufficient condition for a disjunctive property to exist is that at least one of its
disjuncts exists, and this might not even be a necessary condition. Similarly, it is
sufficient for an analogous property to exist that one of its analogue instances exist,
and it is sufficient for a determinable property to exist that one of its determinates
exist. Provided that, in every world, some fundamental mode of being is instantiated,
existence is sure to be found.
4.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I focused on the nature of ontological categories. I argued that,
insofar as the notion of an ontological category is theoretically fruitful, we should
take ontological categories to be modes of being. I discussed one way in which
ontological categories as modes of being could be used to formulate interesting and
powerful principles about what is metaphysically possible. I also discussed whether it
is necessary which ontological categories there are, and the prospects for a putative
discipline of formal ontology construed as that which studies the essence of an object
qua object.