Fs, to be sure. But the fact (if it is one) that the existence of ordinary objects can be
established via similar arguments also does notestablishthat the Fs and ordinary
objects have the same ontological status. Even if the existence of material objects and
the existence of holes are both guaranteed by trivial arguments, all holes have a
poorer form of existence than (some) material objects. It is a defect of Thomasson’s
meta-ontological system if it cannot recognize this.
Is it possible that everything is a being by courtesy? I have to confess to a strong
inclination to deny this possibility: it is a fundamental metaphysical truth—an axiom
if you like—that something is genuinely real. I doubt this truth is capable of proof.
But my inclination does not lead me to think that the alternative is either incoherent
or should be decisively rejected, or that we should ignore arguments to the contrary.
Turner (2011) provides an interesting defense of something like this view, on which
the fundamental structure of reality is one without entities.^45 On such a view, nothing
reallyexists.
I suspect that there are precedents for such a view in the philosophy of Nāgārjuna.
One of the key technical terms in his metaphysical system is“emptiness”and one of
the most profound of his doctrines is thateverythingis empty.^46 Unsurprisingly, in
the extant secondary literature, there is much debate about what is meant by
“emptiness.”Here arefive of the candidates: to be empty is to fail to be a substance^47 ;
to be empty is to lack an essence in the strict sense^48 ; to be empty is to lack an
intrinsic nature^49 ; to be empty is to not exist at all, i.e., for it to be illusory that one
exists^50 ; to be empty is to exist merely conventionally.^51 I would add a sixth candidate
for consideration: to be empty is to be a mere being by courtesy, i.e., to exist but not to
reallyexist.^52 (And another possibility is that the right conception of emptiness is
some combination of the previously mentioned options.)
(^45) See also Bliss (2013, 2014) for critical examination of the arguments for the claim that there must be
fundamental entities. 46
47 This is the principal metaphysical thesis of Nāgārjuna (2010 and 2013).
Westerhoff (2009: 24–44) discusses an interpretation of the technical term“svabhāva,”which seems
to stand for that which exists in the primary way vs. a second-class way of existing. If there were substances,
they would exist in a primary way. In Nāgārjuna (2010), Westerhoff opts to translate this term as
“substance.”Garfield (2002: 10) says that empty things are“devoid of substance”; see also Garfield
(2002: 38). 48
See Garfield (2002: 24, 50–1). I admit I am not sure what“essence”means in this context. By“essence
in the strict sense,”I mean the non-modal notion of essence defended by Fine (1994a, 1995b) and others;
this notion will be the focus of chapter 9. Perhaps it is better to attribute to Garfield the view that empty
objects lack intrinsic natures instead (or in addition). See also Westerhoff (2009: 20 49 – 3).
See Napper (1989: 3), who writes that all things are empty of“being autonomous entities, of having
some‘own thing,’some intrinsic nature that comes from their own side without depending on external
causes and conditions or on a subjective factor of those who observe them. 50 ”See also Garfield (2002: 60–8).
Burton (1999: xi, 4, 39) notes that Nāgārjuna rejects nihilism, but argues that nonetheless Nāgārjuna
is committed to it. Westerhoff (2009: 186) notes that many of his competitors attribute nihilism to
Nā 51 gārjuna, but that he does not hold it. See also Napper (1989: 4–5).
52 See Burton (1999: xi, 37) and Siderits (2007: 143–4).
Westerhoff (2009: 24) does identify those things with svabhāva as primary existents rather than
secondary ones.