relationship betweenxandymight fail to obtain. We can’t assess this question
without examining also what the correct metaphysics is.
The upshot of this section: I accept the acceptability of talking about a relation of
grounding between entities of potentially any ontological category. But I view it as
metaphysically superficial. The deeper work is done by various kinds of ontological
superiority and the connective relations between entities that are independently
needed in the correct metaphysical system.
8.3 Fact Grounding
Let us turn now to the idea that grounding is best construed as a kind of relation
between facts or propositions specifically rather than entities more generally. Let’s
first address an initial complaint. Many proponents of“fact grounding”prefer to
regiment grounding talk with a sentential operator precisely to avoid ontological
commitment to facts, propositions, or other such entities. Nonetheless, I will proceed
to talk in terms of a relation between facts, and not merely because it is convenient. It
is clear that there are facts and propositions; the interesting ontological question is
how these entities exist, not whether they exist in some way or other. (I’ll have more
to say about how facts exist momentarily.) And proponents of operator-talk grant
that, if there are such entities, then there is a straightforward translation of operator-
talk into talk of relations between them.
If the task is to articulate aconceptof grounding that is maximally neutral with
respect to any possible metaphysical debate, then I can see why one might want to
regiment via a sentence operator. However, that’s not my task! I am supposing that
proponents of grounding have succeeded in latching on to some aspect of reality, and
I want to understand that aspect itself rather than articulate some concept of it, the
thinness of which might not reflect the complexity of its object.Perhapsgrounding is
metaphysically primitive in one of the ways articulated earlier;perhapsit in some
sense lacks internal complexity or aspects that can be teased apart;perhapsit is not an
entity at all. Butperhapsnone of this is the case. How do we decide which is true
independently of doingfirst-order metaphysics?
Shamik Dasgupta has suggested to me a motivation for casting ground talk in
terms of sentence operators even if it is obvious that there are facts and propositions.
Even if one is confident that there are such entities, one might be less confident about
their nature. And one might be concerned not to let one’s theory about the nature of
propositions warp one’s theory about grounding. For example, if propositions are
sets of possible worlds, one could not accept a hyperintensional grounding relation
between propositions.
My response is that this purported motivation is an instance of the same tendency
that I am pushing back against: the tendency to try to theorize about grounding in as
much independence fromfirst-order metaphysics as possible. This tendency should