generic grounding and also many other grounding relations such that each of them is
more specific than generic grounding in the sense that they relate fewer kinds of
entities or facts than generic grounding. (My paradigmatic pluralist about grounding
holds analogous views to a paradigmatic ontological pluralist.) The pluralist holds
that these specific relations are at least as fundamental (in whatever sense of
“fundamental”is apt in this case) as generic grounding; the paradigmatic pluralist
holds that they aremorefundamental than generic grounding.
Thin pluralism is the view that each of the specific relations of grounding cannot
be identified with the small-g relations we might antecedently recognize, but rather
each must be taken on its own terms. Fine (2012a: 39–40) appears to be a thin
pluralist in this sense; he distinguishes between what he callsmetaphysical,nomo-
logical, andnormativegrounding but proffers no analyses or identifications of these
relations.^65 Thick pluralism is the view that each specific relation of grounding just is
one of the small-g relations, such as constitution or determination, that we ante-
cedently recognized. Perhaps Wilson (2014) could be thought of as a thick pluralist.
Interim positions are possible as well.
All pluralists must face the question of how the many relate to the one. Compositional
pluralists believe in a plurality of specific composition relations as well as a generic
relation of composition. Ontological pluralists believe in a plurality of modes of being as
well as being itself. Grounding pluralists believe in specific relations of grounding as
well as generic grounding. In each case, it is fair to ask: what if anything unifies the
specific properties or relations? Is the generic property or relation a mere disjunc-
tion? Is the generic property or relation a determinable of which the specific
properties or relations are its determinates? Is the generic property or relation an
analogous property or relation? If it is an analogous property or relation, is it one
with or without a focal specification?^66
Fine (2012a: 38–40) says that generic grounding is something like a disjunction of
the specifics. Notice that he does not say that it is ameredisjunction.Thatposition is
extremely implausible. Metaphysical, nomological, and normative grounding have
more unity than metaphysical grounding, nomological grounding, and theis 5 feet
fromrelation. That’s more like a mere disjunction! So in what does the unity consist?
And can that unity be explained without appeal to a notion like naturalness or degree
of being?
Perhaps their unity consists in the fact that each of the specific relations plays
similar roles in their respectivefield of application and satisfies similar formal
principles. The extant specification of those roles is not particularly illuminating
though: in each case, the role is to be an explanatory relation for why something is the
case. And satisfying a set of formal principles doesn’t generate that much unity; there
(^65) Mulligan (2006a: 38) also distinguishes between an essentialist and a normative sense of“because.”
(^66) As noted earlier, Cameron (2014) discusses the hypothesis that grounding is an analogous relation
with a focal specification.