metaphysical theorizing. However, ifparthoodandgroundingare not perfectly
natural properties or relations, then they might not have strict essences for us to
intuit.
I’ll close this section with the following methodological remarks. It is certainly not
obvious that everything has a strict essence, even if some entities do. Far more
caution in attributing strict essences to entities is warranted. Consider, for example,
that the very kind of entity Fine appeals to in the context of arguing that we need a
notion of strict essence might itself be ontologically dubious, namely classes or sets.
Fine (1994a) argues that we need the notion of strict essence in order to distinguish
Socrates from Socrates’s singleton, both of which are to be found at all the same
possible worlds. Fine notes that it is no part of Socrates’s essence that he is a member
of his singleton, but that it is a part of Socrates’s singleton’s essence that Socrates is its
sole member.^18 But sets themselvesmightbe ontologically equivalent to heaps or
aggregates, and hence mere beings by courtesy. In which case, they lack strict
essences, and hence it is not part of the strict essence of Socrates’s singleton that it
has Socrates as its sole member.^19
9.3 Do Truths about the Strict Essences of Things
Entail the Existence of Those Things?Here we will pursue the question of what is entailed by strict essentialist claims about
an object independently of any concerns about the possible grounds for such claims.
This question is tied with the historically important question of whether and in what
sense essence precedes existence.^20
Consider the conjunction of all true essentialist claims abouty. This proposition is
thetotal propositional essenceofy.^21 We will now distinguish three views about total
propositional essences.
First,the Cartesian view. On the Cartesian view, an essentialist claim aboutxcan
be true even ifxdoes not actually exist, but that claim does imply that possiblyx
exists. My choice of name indicates my belief that Descartes accepts this view.^22
(^18) See also Koslicki (2012a: 188), who approvingly makes use of the same argument. Oderberg (2007: 8)
is a fan of real essence but is skeptical about this argument. 19
Another worry worth briefly mentioning: it is unclear how Fine’s (1994a) suggested reduction of
metaphysically necessary truths to truths of strict essence will fare if not everything has an essence. We’ll
revisit Fine 20 ’s suggested reduction in section 9.7.
21 Aristotle wrestles with this question in thePosterior AnalyticsII.8, 93a16–24 (Aristotle 1984a: 153).
Perhaps it could also be called“the real definition ofy.”As Koslicki (2013: 171) notes, real definitions
can be thought of as propositions that state the essences of things. 22
In Descartes’(1991a: 45)Fifth Meditation, we are told that even if there are no triangles, there are still
determinate essences of triangles. In hisReplies to the First Set of Objections(Descartes 1991a: 83), we are
told that what we clearly and distinctly perceive is possible. We can clearly and distinctly perceive essences;
hence, the things that have those essences must be possible. And we are told in hisReplies to the Fifth Set of
Objections(1991a: 263) that the idea of a triangle (which corresponds to a genuine essence) contains the
idea of possible existence, unlike the idea of a chimera (which does not correspond to a genuine essence).