The Fragmentation of Being

What is the relation between truth-making and grounding? Unclear! (Though as
we saw in section 9.2, some believe that the notion of ground must be appealed to
when explaining the notion of truth-making.) Let’s stipulate that forxto be a truth-
maker of Pis for the proposition that xexists to entail the truth ofP. Let’s
provisionally assume that grounding is a relation between propositions, and that
whenPgroundsQ, it follows thatPentailsQ. Let us say thatxis anontic groundforP
if and only if the proposition thatxexists groundsP. On these assumptions, ifxis an
ontic ground forP, thenxis a truth-maker forP. In what follows, I am going to set
aside the question of truth-making and focus on the question of grounding.
In light of what was said earlier, ifxis an ontic ground of the total propositional
essence ofy, then let us say thatxis (one of)y’sontic essence(s). Since, in general, a
fact can have multiple grounds, it might be that there are multiple entities that are the
ontic grounds of a given essentialist fact, and this definition leaves this open. It will be
nice also to have a more discriminating notion of ontic essence to work with. Let’s say
thatxisy’sfinal ontic essencejust in case eitherxis the unique ontic essence ofyor
any other ontic essence ofyis such that its existence is grounded in the existence ofx.
And let us say thatxisy’sultimate ontic essencejust in case (i) necessarily, ifxexists,
thenxis thefinal ontic essence ofy, and (ii) necessarily, ifyhas an ontic essence, then
xis thefinal ontic essence ofy.
In what follows, we will focus on putative candidates for being ultimate ontic
essences. Each choice of a candidate raises interesting metaphysical questions.
However, there are two general metaphysical issues about the connection between
essence and ground raised by any choice, which I will discuss before turning to the
specific questions about specific candidates.
Here is thefirst issue. Recall the proposal discussed in section 9.2 that grounding
facts are grounded in facts about essences. Suppose that A grounds B. On the view
under consideration, the total propositional essence of B grounds the fact that
A grounds B. This view, in conjunction with the demand for ontic grounds for
essentialist claims, generates an interesting infinite series. (I hesitate to use the word
“regress.”) Call the total propositional essence of B“C.”C grounds the fact that
A grounds B. But, if C has an ontic ground, then there is a proposition D that
expresses the existence of this ontic ground and that grounds C. What grounds the
fact that D grounds C? The total propositional essence of C. And so on. Perhaps this
series is not a vicious regress, but we should be cognizant of its existence. One way
out is to abandon the view that facts about grounding are grounded in facts about
essences. If grounding facts must be grounded, there are other views on the table,
such as the view defended by Bennett and deRosset. Another way out is to deny that
there are ontic grounds for essentialist claims.
But another possibility is to deny that facts about essences have a ground at all—
and this takes us to the second general metaphysical issue that we should address.
One position worth considering, recently defended by Dasgupta (2016), is that facts
about essences are not merely ungrounded, but are not evenaptto be grounded.

 BEING AND ESSENCE