Earlier, I suggested thatformis a traditional candidate for an ontic essence. But
interestingly some advocates of substantial forms also seem to think of essences as a
distinct kind of entity. First, let us consider Aquinas on created incorporeal agents,
such as angels. These entities are not hylomorphic compounds, since they have no
matter. Instead, they are forms. However, they are nonetheless not absolutely
simple—even angels have some metaphysical complexity, since in them there is a
realdistinction between existence and essence.^70 For Aquinas, to say that there is
a real distinction between essence and existence is not obviously to say that the entity
that is the essence of a thing could exist without the thing existing, but it is still to
treat essences as some sort of entity.^71 Treating essences as entities seems to be the
position of Giles of Rome, who distinguishes both matter and form and existence and
essence, but holds that there are many distinctions between these pairs.^72 He also
appeals to a real distinction between essence and existence in order to explain the
possibility of creation.^73 Even more than in Aquinas, Giles of Rome does seem to
treat essences as entities of some sort.^74 However, these essences cannot be (modally)
separated from that which they are essences of.^75
So it seems that neither Aquinas’s nor Giles of Rome’s position provides the basis
for an argument that truths of essence are modally independent of truths of existence.
Perhaps the appropriate basis of such an argument is the view of Avicenna, which
many interpret as the claim that existence is a superadded accident of essence.^76
(^70) MacDonald (2002: 150–1) notes that, for Aquinas, even in separated substances, there is a real
distinction between essence and existence, and so separated substances are not absolutely simple. See also
Kenny (2005a: 33) and Nolan (2015). Trentman (2000: 882) claims that Suárez interprets Aquinas as
holding that essences are entities. 71
For a contrary view, see Wippel (2000: 395), who says that Aquinas does not think of essence and
existence as things but rather as“ontological principles.”Brower (2014: 17–18, 196) claims that Aquinas
does not think of essences as entities but rather talk of a real distinction between essence and existence
serves to emphasize the ontological dependence of creatures on God. Kenny (2005a: 35) suggests an even
more deflationary view: the doctrine of the real distinction betweenesseand essence amounts to the claim
that I can grasp a concept without knowing whether it is instantiated. 72
Giles of Rome (1953: 38–41). Matsen (1974: 77) credits Giles of Rome with being thefirst to
formulate the view that there is a real distinction between essence and existence in creatures, and this is
a distinction between two 73 things.
In Giles of Rome (1953: 36), we are told that creation takes place when God“impresses”an existence
on an essence, and at (1953: 100) he explicitly asserts that without the distinction between existence and
essence, a thing would be eternal and unable to be created. See Cunningham (1970: 62–3) and Wippel
(1982: 134 74 – 41; 2000: 396–7).
But see Wippel (2000: 396–8) for discussion that suggests that this aspect of Giles of Rome’s thought
should be downplayed. 75
Some attribute the view that essences aresui generisentities with their own mode of being to Henry of
Ghent as well. See, e.g., Coffey (1938: 87), Gilson (1952: 76), and Wielockx (2006: 297 76 – 9).
Averroes (1987: 236) claims that Avicenna thinks of the existence of a thing as an“attribute
additional to its essence.”See also Wippel (2000: 393), Miller (2002: 16), and Donati (2006: 267), the
latter of whom suggests that Giles of Rome’s position is quite close to Avicenna’s. For criticism of this
interpretation of Avicenna, see Morewedge (1972). See also Galluzzo (2014: 239–42) and Shehadi (1982:
75 – 7). Gilson (1952: 91) says that Anthony of Brindisi also thought that existence is an accident of essence,
and that perhaps Wolff thought so as well (1949: 118).