view might be defended by appealing to considerations about the different ways in
which objects and events have parts or persist through time.^5
Let us call the specific properties from which an analogous property is derived
theanalogue instancesof that property. (Analogue instances of a common analo-
gous property areanalogatesof each other.) The relation between an analogous
property and its analogue instances is similar to the relation between a determin-
able property and its determinates in that analogue instances and determinates are
both“specifications”of a“broader property.”However, there is one key difference:
on my view, all determinates of a determinable are equally natural, and any
determinate of a determinable is as natural as the determinable.^6 But neither
need be true of analogous properties and their analogue instances.
An example of a property that is not analogous isbeing a bank. Something is a
bank just in case it is either a riverbank or afinancial institution. Clearly there is a
difference betweenbeing a bankandbeing healthy, even though it is very hard to
precisely state in what this difference consists.Being a bankis a mere disjunction,
whilebeing healthyis analogous. The individual ways of being healthy (the analogue
instances ofbeing healthy) have something importantly in common with each other
that is not captured by treatingbeing healthyas a mere disjunction.^7
Similarly, even if God’s way of existing and the way of existing of created things are
numerically distinct, these two ways of existing are similar enough to ensure that
existence simpliciterisnota mere disjunction of the two. If God’s way of existing
and creaturely ways of existing were radically unalike, it would be hard to see what
would make these features ways ofexistingas opposed to just two totally different
features. There is a serious issue here: what, if anything, accounts for theunityof
analogous properties? Can anything explain why analogue instances form an analo-
gous property rather than a mere disjunction?
Suppose analogous properties always enjoyed focal specifications. That is, each
analogous property is such that among its analogue instances one is the most natural
and the others derive their degree of naturalness by virtue of how they are related
to this most natural analogue instance. This more or less is the picture of health
and being depicted in the previous chapter. Then we would be able to make some
headway at answering these questions.
Unfortunately, however, I think there is good reason to doubt that all analogous
properties have this feature. In a few moments, I’ll explain why I think that parthood
(^5) See McDaniel (2014a) for a discussion of the motivations for this kind of identity pluralism. We’ll have
more to say about the status of identity in section 5.7. 6
This is a controversial view, to be sure. Armstrong (1997: 50) advocates a reductionist view about
determinable properties, and Rosen (2010: 128–9) is sympathetic to treating determinables as mere
disjunctions of their determinates. By contrast, Wilson (2012) is a full-fledged defender of some funda-
mental determinable properties. I side with Wilson here. 7
The boundary between mere disjunctiveness and analogicity is vague, because some properties are
more disjunctive than others. Conversely, some analogous properties might enjoy more unity than others.
This will be further discussed shortly.