first-order logic. On this thesis, if you want to know what“existence”means, you
need to study the logic of quantification.^11
Recall that in the previous chapter we discussed how to accommodate ontological
pluralists such as Heidegger by taking on board the Lewisian–Siderian notion of
naturalness, and holding that there are possible semantically primitive restrictedquan-
tifiers that are at least as natural as the unrestricted quantifier of ordinary English. For
the Heideggerian, these quantifiers aremorenatural than the existential quantifier.
On this view, it would bemetaphysically betterto speak one of those languages than
the languages we actually speak. Modes of being areontological joints, and a language
is metaphysically better to the extent that its primitive notions correspond to real
distinctions. But note that one could hold this view without holding that the ordinary
English word“existence”is ambiguous or that its meaning is not captured by the
existential quantifier of formal logic. The possible semantically primitive quantifiers
might bemerelypossible rather than actually realized in a natural language.^12 So the
doctrine that things exist in different ways is compatible with the neo-Quinean thesis,
although one could hold that things exist in different ways while rejecting the neo-
Quinean thesis. Accordingly, the claim that there are modes of being is not refuted by
the view that the meaning of“existence”or“being”is fully captured by the role of the
existential quantifier of formal logic.^13
This way of characterizing ontological pluralism plausibly implies that whether
ontological pluralism is true can’t be contingent.^14 This consequence is acceptable to
me. However, there might still be a kind of contingency in the neighborhood: it might
be that, in some worlds, only one of the many perfectly natural quantifiers has a non-
empty domain. In that sense, ontological pluralism might be contingently true.
Finally, in what follows I talk as if existence is afirst-order property, though not
much turns on this. First, I am happy to formulate the views that follow in accord-
ance with what we can callthe Kant-Frege thesis, according to which existence is a
property, but not of individuals. Rather, existence is a second-order property of
concepts, propositional functions, or properties.^15 Because nothing in what follows
(^11) For an apparent expression of this thesis, see Quine (1969b). I doubt that Quine ever held the neo-
Quinean thesis, since the thesis is true only if a term in one language—English—is synonymous with a term
in a distinct language, the language of formal logic. But many contemporary philosophers do endorse this
thesis. Peter van Inwagen (2001b) is one prominent example among many. 12
There are some tricky issues about what it means for a possible language to realize a quantifier.
I assume that the English expression“there is”is synonymous with the German expression“es gibt.”Each
of these expressions is a quantifier-expression, but I would prefer to say that there is just one quantifier that
each expresses. It is not obvious that saying this requires reifying quantifier meanings as abstract objects
over and above the particular quantifier-expressions. See Sider (2011: ch. 10.2) for a more extensive
discussion. 13
Szabó (2003) suggests that something like this view about the meaning of“being”is what led many
contemporary philosophers to reject modes of being. 14
15 Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion here.
Whether Kant himself endorsed the Kant-Frege thesis is controversial. See Kant (1999a: 567, A600/
B628) for texts that have inspired some to attribute this thesis to him. Bennett (1966: 199) claims that Kant