absolutely and to exist relative to a scheme. Conceptual relativism of this vaguely
neo-Kantian variety seems most at home with ontological pluralism.
We have explored three views that imply that existence is a systematically variable
feature, and hence arguably an analogous feature. Although each of these ways is
distinct from the others, I see no immediate problems with a theory that combines
them. Consider a view that holds that mathematical objects enjoy absolute existence,
mereological simples enjoy temporally relativized existence, composite objects exist
relative to conceptual schemes, and accidents exist in simples or composites. Insofar
as each part of the package can be motivated, the whole might be as well. That certain
modes of being are relational also suggests the possibility of a“ladder of being”;
consider, for example, a view in which space–times are substances, material objects
have being-there, and accidents have being-in. On this view, accidents occupy the
lowest rung on the ladder.
Views that imply that existence is systematically variably polyadic are well worth
pursuing. However, it is now time to pursue a different approach: let us examine
views that imply that existence is systematically variably axiomatic.
2.5 The Logic of Being
The second approach to motivating modes of being is to determine whetherbeingor
existenceis systematically variably axiomatic. In order to determine this, wefirst need
to address which principles govern existence.
Comparing existence and parthood has served us well so far, so we will continue to
pursue relevant similarities. Mereology is the“logic”of parthood. Mereology is the
study of part and whole; mereological principles are just those principles that govern
the parthood relation. However, if compositional pluralism is true, there is more than
one fundamental parthood relation, and hence, strictly speaking, there are many
mereologies, not one.
What is the“logic”of being? One plausible answer is that the“logic”of being is the
logic of quantification. Earlier, we said that a principle governs a certain feature if it
is a necessary truth that can be stated using only logical vocabulary and some term
that represents the feature.^48 The term in question might be a name or a predicate. In
the case we are now considering, the bit of logical vocabulary that representsexistence
is the existential quantifier.
If the logic of quantification were to work one way when applied to objects of one
kind, and another way when applied to objects of a different kind, then logic itself
would display variable systematicity. Accordingly,existencewould be systematically
existence whereasconsciousnessenjoys a form of absolute existence. See Smith (1995: 375–6) for a
discussion.
(^48) This is a sufficient condition, but it is not necessarily a necessary condition. We will discuss the
possibility of“substantive”non-logical governing principles in section 2.7.