176 7: Decision Th eory
the psychology of decisionmaking (Barnard 1938; McGregor 1960; Simon
1947/1997), it seems only logical public administration scholars should look to
this emerging fi eld for new insights into how bureaucrats make decisions.
Th e basic premise of this new decision-theoretic framework is to move beyond
“intendedly rational” as a description of decisionmaking. Bounded rationality
implies that with complete information and lacking environmental constraints,
decisions would resemble pure rationality. Th e nonrational framework emerging
from Tversky and Kahneman’s research suggests otherwise; even with complete
information and absent external constraints, decisions follow a predictable pat-
tern based on the way in which individuals process information. Th e nonrational
framework also begins to explain why individuals are bounded and, as we discuss
later in the chapter, allows for a more predictable theoretical framework. Non-
rationality would suggest that the logic of consequences is not possible, or at the
very least subject to constant changes based on biases in information processing.
Th e logic of appropriateness presents a more realistic framework for decision-
making, but even here, more emphasis on the psychology of decisionmaking is
required.
Revisiting the Logic of Consequences
It is with two arguments in mind that we now revisit the logic of consequences
and the logic of appropriateness. Th e fi rst argument contends decisions are lim-
ited by informational constraints (Bendor, Taylor, and van Gaalen 1987). To sum
up the second argument, “People tend to be somewhat mindless, passive decision
makers” (Th aler and Sunstein 2009, 37).
Information
First, the capacity of individuals and organizations to process information, par-
ticularly in an information-rich environment, is illustrated by the functioning of
Internet search engines. Sorting and then processing information by preferences,
priorities, and reliability are notoriously diffi cult; and even when well done,
properly sorted information must still be interpreted. Th e capacity to summa-
rize, comprehend, and use information has its limits. Inferred causal connections
among information, actions, and outcomes are ordinarily weak. Second, individ-
ual and institutional memories are oft en faulty, compartmentalized, diffi cult to
retrieve, and hard to connect to the problems at hand. Th ird, attention, in both
time and capabilities, is limited. Oft en, an overload of problems needs attention,
and not all problems can be treated at once. Fourth, especially in organizations
with complex technologies, communication problems arise from compartmen-
talization, professional subculture, language, and information overload.
Under conditions of bounded rationality, decisionmakers cope with imperfect
information by editing and sorting, a process guided by assumptions based on