220 8: Rational Choice Th eory and Irrational Behavior
review of the number of journal articles, and even journals (e.g. Organizational
Psychology founded in 2011), attests to the strength of this movement. Some of
the discipline’s most well-respected fi gures, Simon and Ostrom, were strong ad-
vocates of the need to draw on theory and evidence from other disciplines, pri-
marily psychology and economics. To date, however, the fi eld at large has been
reluctant to more directly situate itself as interdisciplinary (Wright 2011). Some,
such as Elinor Ostrom, have even explored and utilized theoretical insights from
beyond the social sciences, to include biology and environmental science. Th e no-
tion that communication within CPRs can facilitate trust and prevent hoarding
illustrates an important distinction between maximizing short-term and long-
term self- interest. People are willing and able to avoid maximizing short-term
self-interest (e.g., overgrazing) in order to maximize long-term self-interest (e.g.,
the longevity of the pasture). Although still a form of utility maximization, ratio-
nal choice theory, as currently conceptualized within public administration, does
not distinguish between the two, or when one or the other will be pursued.
Despite such shortcomings, there is hope for public administration and the
potential for the development of a dominant paradigm as advocated by Vincent
Ostrom. As discussed earlier in this and the previous chapter, early attempts to
apply rational choice theory to the behavior of bureaucrats and citizens break
down in light of recent evidence on human decisionmaking. A brief web search
on Amazon or Barnes and Noble using the keyword “irrational” will reveal that
since the mid-1990s there has been a tremendous increase in the attention de-
voted to patterns of decisionmaking that depart from the rational actor model
described in the fi rst part of this chapter. Common to most of these texts is the
notion that rationality is rarely defi ned in terms of maximizing economic utility.
Rather, humans tend to engage in behavior that, although less than fi nancially
maximizing, is in large part predictable. Th e title of Dan Ariely’s book Predictably
Irrational (2009) is an appropriate moniker for this emerging line of research.
Beyond Vincent Ostrom and Simon, perhaps few have shaped decision the-
ory and rational choice theory more than has Elinor Ostrom. To rein in self-
interested bureaucrats, orthodox public administration advised a top-down,
centralized management structure. Revisions from Tullock, Downs, Niskanen,
and Tiebout suggested that competition and market forces were a more practical
alternative to achieving effi ciency. Ostrom’s work on common pool resources
suggests that the solution may in fact be endogenous—within-group communi-
cation allows for the establishment of self-regulating institutions. Coordination,
and thus effi ciency, can be achieved without competition and without centralized
control. Even though Ostrom’s work on CPR dilemmas is consistent and robust,
the implications for large-scale bureaucracies are less clear. Nonetheless, institu-
tions able to facilitate open communication and participatory decisionmaking
processes are most likely to engender trust and the accompanying organizational
benefi ts that it provides.