Governance as the New Public Management 231
increasingly accepted as equal partners in the policy process. (3) Th e blending of
public and private resources: Public and private actors use each other to obtain
resources they cannot access independently. For example, using private compa-
nies for policy implementation allows government to sidestep some expensive
and time-consuming procedural and accountability issues. Private companies can
persuade the state to bankroll projects that benefi t the public interest but are un-
likely to be funded by the private sector. (4) Use of multiple instruments: Th is
means an increasing willingness to develop and employ nontraditional methods
of making and implementing public policy. Th ese are oft en indirect instruments,
such as using tax incentives to infl uence behavior rather than command-and-
control regulations to mandate behavior.
If these elements defi ne governance, Peters and Pierre (1998) observe that
NPM and governance obviously share a good deal of common ground. Both
models shrink the traditional roles and responsibilities of elected offi cials. Rep-
resentatives are still expected to set long-term goals, develop networks, and help
pool public and private resources, but they are no longer the dominant policy
actors. Essentially, NPM and the general thrust of the governance debate propose
shift ing power from public offi ce or legal mandates to “entrepreneurial activity”
in policy networks. Th is shift in power not only characterizes NPM and gover-
nance but also creates a shared problem of accountability. If public offi cials have
less power and responsibility, is it fair or even possible to hold them accountable
for public policy? If the answer is no, who or what should be held accountable for
public policy? NPM tackles the accountability issue by leveraging the powers of
supply and demand. Public service providers should compete with each other to
satisfy clientele demand. Th is, however, redefi nes rather than solves the account-
ability problem (Peters and Pierre 1998). A homogenous clientele group does not
necessarily represent the wishes and wants of the broader pool of taxpayers who
foot the bill for the public services this group consumes. If public service provid-
ers are held accountable to their clientele, the problem of regulatory capture is
raised; that is, the service providers seek to benefi t the clientele rather than serve
the public interest.
Another similarity between NPM and governance is that both are predicated
on an assumption that government is too distant from citizens and society, and
that its agents have become ineffi cient and discourteous as a result (Peters and
Pierre 2000). Although the forces of a globalizing economy forced private-sector
operations to become leaner, to be more attentive and responsive to their custom-
ers, and to develop and adopt more sophisticated management tools, government
operations were insulated from these changes because of government monopolies
over public service production. Both models seek to use competition to cor-
rect the ineffi ciencies held to be inherent in the traditional bureaucratic model
and to force public service providers to become more responsive to the citizens
they serve. NPM and governance are also both results oriented. In contrast to