The Public Administration Theory Primer

Are Bureaucracies Out of Control? 31

legislature) is controlled by the other party, who is to have control? In orthodox
public administration theory, as well as in virtually every proposal for reform, the
elected executive is understood to be at the top of the control hierarchy. Robert
Gilmour and Alexis Halley, based on a careful observation of Congress, several
presidents, and the federal bureaucracy in ten specifi c case studies, suggest that
the “co-management” of bureaucracy is a more apt empirical description. If this
is so, developing an empirically testable control-of-bureaucracy theory is made
much more complex. Th ey suggest the following:

Th e cases collectively suggest that the term congressional co-management of pol-

icy implementation and program execution characterizes the transition from a

congressional reliance on post-audit oversight of executive branch performance

to pre-audit congressional program controls and direct congressional participa-

tion with the executive in the full scope of policy and program development and

implementation. Th e cases show a “congressional co-manager” intervening di-

rectly in the details of policy development and management rather than enacting

vague, wide-ranging, sweeping statutes to change fundamental policy directions.

Th e cases also suggest that congressional co-management is as much a result of

actions in the executive branch as it is a result of actions in the legislative branch.

(1994, 335)

Based on this observation and on their case studies, they present the following
hypotheses:

Eff ects on Policy and Programs

1. “Congressional intervention has prompted or forced changes in pro-
   gram priorities, directions, the speed of program implementation, and
   the visibility of programs on the executive policy agenda.” (352)


2. “Congressional intervention has had intended eff ects on substantive
   policy outcomes and other eff ects that were neither intended nor antic-
   ipated.” (353)


3. “Congressional intervention has operated to keep both branches fo-
   cused on narrowly defi ned, short-run programs and has inclined to
   continue existing programs while submerging hard questions about
   alternatives or large policy issues.” (354)

Eff ects on Congressional Oversight

1. “Th e Congress observed in these ten case studies was not a gadfl y. Once
   particular committees, members, and staff s were involved in the de-
   tails of implementation, they tended to stay involved until the situation