62 3: Th eories of Bureaucratic Politics
In meeting this challenge, those who advocate the theory of representative
bureaucracy begin by seeking an answer to the same question posed by Wilson:
Why do bureaucrats do what they do? Specifi cally, the focus is on explaining the
behavior of bureaucrats when they exercise discretionary authority. Generally,
it is assumed that bureaucrats are rational actors in the sense that they pursue
self-interested goals when faced with discretionary choices. Proponents of rep-
resentative bureaucracy argue that the goals driving behavior are supplied by the
individual values of the decisionmaker. Th us, “if the administrative apparatus
makes political decisions, and if bureaucracy as a whole has the same values as
the American people as a whole, then the decisions made by the bureaucracy will
be similar to the decisions made if the entire American public passed on the is-
sues. . . . If values are similar, rational decisions made so as to maximize these
values will also be similar” (Meier 1975, 528). Th is suggests that bureaucratic
power can be harnessed to diverse and representative social interests even though
the orthodox organizational arrangements of public administration are insulated
from the basic processes and values of democracy. If the ranks of the civil service
refl ect the diverse interests and values of society, bureaucracy becomes a repre-
sentative “fourth branch of government” with a legitimate basis for exercising
power in a democratic system.
Th e fi rst scholars to formulate and apply the basic arguments of representative
bureaucracy in the United States were David Levitan (1946) and Norton Long
(1952). Long adopted the most extreme stance, arguing that the national legisla-
ture, which was heavily tilted toward the upper strata of society, did not represent
a variety of important national interests. Instead, “these interests receive more
eff ective and more responsible representation through administrative channels”
(1952, 808). Long’s claim was that the bureaucracy had more of a democratic
character than the legislature because the ranks of the federal civil service were
much more refl ective of the American public. Th at diversity was refl ected in ad-
ministrative decisions, even as narrower interests dominated the decisionmaking
of Congress. Th e normative claim was that the bureaucracy actually made up for
the representative defi ciencies of the legislature.
Although subsequent scholars have generally made less radical normative
claims than Long, the two key questions driving Long’s work have remained the
basic focus of work on representative bureaucracy: (1) Do public agencies broadly
represent the interests and values of the American public? (2) Are these interests
and values refl ected in the policy actions of bureaucracy? Th e fi rst of these ques-
tions deals with the concept of “passive representation,” or the extent to which
the bureaucracy refl ects the composition of society. Kingsley (1944) suggested
that socioeconomic class should be the basic yardstick for comparing the com-
position of the civil service with that of the public. Kingsley’s study, however, was
focused on the British civil service. In the United States, Samuel Krislov (1974)
argued that a more appropriate basis of comparison is race, ethnicity, and sex.
Th ese factors are assumed to be a key source of socialization, and thus of values.