In addition, pollution generated by Taiwanese companies has also led to
protests and even social unrest in some localities. The most recent case
occurred in April 2005. A Taiwanese battery factory in the Caozhou city of
Guangdong Province was found releasing poisonous wastes into the local
river. The effluents then polluted adjacent fishing farms and caused severe
damages to fish farmers. On 15 April, 2005, thousands of villagers attacked
the factory and seized equipment and machinery. As the battery factory is
owned by Mei Mei, a large corporation with more than 8000 workers, this
incident attracted attention from the general public. However, local officials
did not provide sufficient security to maintain order. The Taiwanese factory
owner filed complaints with the central government, accusing local officials of
incompetence.^69
CONCLUSIONS
The economic structures of states shape incentives for productive enterprises,
which affects the pressure they put on the environment. In China, the greatest
environmental destruction occurred during the Maoist era, when huge SOEs
used raw materials and energy willy-nilly, without concern for environmental
effects. The post-Maoist economic reforms have reduced the SOE’s role in the
economy, but they have created new opportunities for local enterprises whose
dynamic expansion comes at a high environmental cost. In Taiwan, SOEs have
played a less conspicuous role; SMEs, the engines of Taiwan’s rapid growth,
are easier to control for environmental effects, because their size does not rival
the state’s.
State-business relationships in both China and Taiwan are more intimate
than in most western capitalist nations. It is relatively easier for the state to
penetrate business firms, and they, in turn, can more easily obtain access to
state decision-makers than non-economic groups (and by extension, are able
on occasion to corrupt political processes). The European corporatist model
applies imperfectly to China and Taiwan. Taiwan still has some characteristics
of the developmental state, and China displays residual traits of state
corporatism. This does not present opportunities for linkage of the state, large
business firms or peak associations, and environmental coalitions as seen in
some European countries. This is largely because the core interests of the state
in China and Taiwan do not yet emphasize environmental conservation values.
Foreign multinationals play large roles in both China and Taiwan, by
providing FDI and advanced knowledge. They have been channels for
diffusion of global environmental standards and technology. We saw this in the
cases of Shell and EDAW in China, which compare, at earlier times, to
multinational operations in Taiwan (such as those of Singer). On the other
154 Governance of biodiversity conservation in China and Taiwan