The Economist April 30th 2022 Leaders 11
U
ltimately, it wasn’t close. Emmanuel Macron stormed to a
second and final term as France’s president, trouncing his
nationalistpopulist rival Marine Le Pen by 58.5% to 41.5% on
April 24th (see Europe section). France and Europe have dodged
a calamity. Had Ms Le Pen won, she would have undermined
nato, appeased Vladimir Putin, challenged the legal founda
tions of the European Union and stoked racial tension at home.
Mr Macron tried to sound humble in victory. “Our country is
beset by doubts and divisions,” he said. “Today’s vote requires us
to consider all of the hardships of people’s lives and to respond
effectively to them and to the anger expressed.” Ms Le Pen artic
ulated that anger, which is one reason why she did better than in
2017, though she offered few coherent remedies. Mr Macron’s re
sponse will determine whether his second term is a success.
First, he will need to keep his majority in parliament. His par
ty, La République en Marche (lrem, note the last two initials),
and its allies currently hold 60% of seats. An election in June is
unpredictable, but there is a good chance he will retain his grip.
What, though, should Mr Macron do with his fresh mandate?
One of his main pieces of unfinished business is to tackle a pen
sion system that France’s rickety finances can ill afford. He has
promised to raise the retirement age from 62 to 65. The snag is,
that will be deeply unpopular, and he has already hinted that he
might settle on 64. Is he ready to face down furious protests by
workers yearning for early retirement? Or will he cave, as he did
to the gilets jaunesand their fueltax protests in 2018? His plan to
Emmanuel Macron has triumphed, but he faces a steep road ahead
The centre holds
France
I
n the earlydaysofthepandemicXiJinping,China’sleader,
suggested that the country was under attack. He spoke of a
“people’s war” against an “invisible enemy”. Visiting Wuhan, the
city where it started, he all but promised victory. Fang Fang, a lo
cal diarist, retorted: “Remember, there is no win, only an end.”
Most countries have accepted that covid cannot be eradicat
ed. Helped by vaccines and treatments, they have decided to live
with the virus. China, however, is still determined to defeat or at
least contain it. The discovery of dozens of cases in Beijing has
led to masstesting (see China section). Individual neighbour
hoods are being locked down. This is less harsh than the medi
cine applied to poorer cities, dozens of which have been entirely
sealed off. Still, Beijing could be next.
Mr Xi seems to relish keeping his country on
a war footing. “Perseverance is victory,” he says
of his “dynamic zerocovid” strategy. That may
be a stirring phrase for rallying China’s legions
of weary healthworkers; but though battles
against individual outbreaks may be won, the
country has no viable path towards overall vic
tory and eventual peace. That will have to in
volve treating covid as a manageable, endemic disease.
China is hardly the only country to have declared war on co
vid. And it has fought the virus better than most. Millions of Chi
nese have been enlisted as foot soldiers, with orders to test and
trace people—and to send the infected to quarantine sites. This
has resulted in the lowest death toll of any big country and, until
now, a covidfree existence for a large majority of its citizens.
The Communist Party thinks its approach superior to democ
racies’ tradeoff between liberty and public health. China puts
“lives above all else”, says Mr Xi. But his war has costs, too. Most
of Shanghai’s 25m residents have been locked down for weeks.
Many woke the other day sealed inside their compounds behind
greenfences.Nota singlecasecanslipthrough. With the zero
covid strategy, ruthlessness is a feature, not a bug (see Chaguan).
China may be willing to bear those costs to keep life safe for
the majority. But other concerns are affecting the party’s calcu
lus. Mr Xi has turned the war on covid into an ideological strug
gle. An old idea has taken hold among apparatchiks: that red fer
vour will get you further than expertise. Officials in Beijing be
lieve it will fare better than Shanghai, which they say pandered
to Western ideas about how to confront the virus.
Beijing may yet turn out better. But making public health a
test of ideological fitness leads to rigid thinking. Many local offi
cials, fearing the sack, have escalated their covidcontrol mea
sures to cruel and irrational levels. Yet at the
same time many have balked at forcing the old
and vulnerable to get jabbed, for fear of being
blamed if they subsequently fall ill.
Meanwhile, staff allocated for the much
needed booster campaign have been redirected
to do mass testing. Because too few of China’s
over80s have been fully vaccinated, reopen
ing risks a wave of deaths. Pity those who sug
gest that the zerocovid policy could be relaxed if jab rates were
higher. Online nationalists assail them as disloyal. To say Chi
na’s covid policies need to evolve is to suggest Mr Xi is fallible. In
a war, orders are to be obeyed, not debated.
Pandemics are not wars, but a global publichealth challenge.
Yet China’s government refuses to approve foreign vaccines,
though they are more effective. It often treats pandemic data as
state secrets. And it is reluctant to learn from other places, in
cluding ideologically impure Taiwan, which have charted paths
out of zerocovid by reallocating resources and vaccinating the
elderly. Treating covid as conflict may suit Mr Xi. But as a shrewd
general once said of a different war: “Tell me how this ends.”n
Xi Jinping continues to treat the pandemic like a war. It’s time for him to adapt
The forever war
Covid-19 in China