The Economist - UK (2022-04-30)

TheEconomistApril30th 2022 BriefingRussia’sarmedforces 17

EstimatedRussiansoldierskilledinbattle

Russia-UkrainewarFeb-Apr ,(UKgov ’testimate)

Second Chechenwar-,(Estimateto)

First Chechenwar-

Soviet-Afghanwar-
,

,

Russiantanksknowntohavebeendestroyed,

abandonedorcapturedSource:Oryx

564

Militaryspending,$bn, adjusted for purchasing-power parity

Sources: “TheRealMilitary Balance: International Comparisons of Defence Spending”, by Peter E. Robertson,  ; SIPRI; The Economist

250

300

200

150

100

50

0

212018161412102008

Russia

Britain

France

Russia

China

United

States

0 200 400 600 800

Russia’s spending on defence

Russia’s defence spending is often

estimated to be $66bn, lower than

Britain’s or India’s. A more accurate

figure, taking account of the cost of living

in Russia, is $253bn. Embezzlement,

however, is thought to be widespread.

Ukraine’s  heroic  resistance,  buoyed  by  a
torrent  of  Western  weaponry  and  intelli­
gence. “But just as much credit for the shat­
tering  of  Russian  illusions  lies  in  a  phe­
nomenon long known to military sociolo­
gists,” writes Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins
University,  “that  armies,  by  and  large,  re­
flect  the  qualities  of  the  societies  from
which they emerge.” Russia’s state, says Mr
Cohen, “rests on corruption, lies, lawless­
ness and coercion”. Each one has been laid
bare by Russia’s army in this war.
“They put a lot of money into modern­
isation,”  says  General  Pavel.  “But  a  lot  of
this  money  was  lost  in  the  process.”  Cor­
ruption  surely  helps  explain  why  Russian
vehicles  were  equipped  with  cheap  Chi­
nese  tyres,  and  thus  found  themselves
stuck in the Ukrainian mud. It may also ex­
plain  why  so  many  Russian  units  found
themselves  without  encrypted  radios  and
were  forced  to  rely  on  insecure  civilian
substitutes  or  even  Ukrainian  mobile
phone  networks.  That,  in  turn,  may  well
have  contributed  to  the  war’s  toll  on  Rus­
sian  generals  (Ukraine  claims  to  have
killed ten of them), since their communi­
cations  at  the  front  line  would  have  been
easier to intercept. 
Yet corruption cannot be the whole sto­
ry.  Ukraine  is  also  corrupt,  and  not  much
less so than Russia: they sit respectively in
122nd and 136th position on the Corruption
Perceptions  Index  published  by  Transpa­
rency  International,  a  pressure  group.
What really distinguishes the two is fight­
ing  spirit.  Ukrainian  soldiers  are  battling

for the survival of their country. Many Rus­

sian ones did not even know they were go­

ing to war until they were ordered over the

border.  A  European  intelligence  official

says  that  conscripts—whom  Mr  Putin  has

repeatedly  and  publicly  promised  not  to

send to war—have resisted pressure to sign

contracts  that  would  turn  them  into  pro­

fessional  soldiers;  others  have  refused  to

serve outright. The official says that units

affected include the 106th Guards Airborne

Division and its 51st Guards Parachute Reg­

iment,  which  are  part  of  the  notionally

elite  vdv airborne  forces,  and  the  423rd

Motorised  Rifle  Regiment,  part  of  an  im­

portant tank division. 

Difficulties in droves

Ill­trained  and  poorly  motivated  soldiers

are a liability in any conflict; they are espe­

cially unsuited to the complexities of mod­

ern  combined­arms  warfare,  which  re­

quires  tanks,  infantry,  artillery  and  air

power  to  work  in  synchrony.  To  attempt

such  daunting  co­ordination  in  Ukraine

with  sullen  teenagers,  press­ganged  into

service,  fed  expired  rations  and  equipped

with  badly  maintained  vehicles  was  the

height of optimism.

Such  a  task  requires,  at  the  very  least,

sound leadership. And that too is in short

supply.  Non­commissioned  officers—se­

nior enlisted men who train and supervise

soldiers—are  the  backbone  of  nato’s

armed forces. Russia does not have a com­

parable  cadre.  There  are  “too  many  colo­

nels  and  not  enough  corporals”,  says  a

European defence official. Staff training is

rigid and outdated, he says, obsessed with

the second world war and with little atten­

tion paid to newer conflicts. That may ex­

plain  why  doctrine  was  thrown  out  of  the

window.  Manoeuvres  that  seemed  easy  at

Vostokand other stage­managed exercises

proved harder to reproduce under fire and

far from home. 

To the extent that Russian officers have

studied their military history, they appear

to  have  imbibed  the  worst  lessons  of  the

Afghan, Chechen and Syrian wars. During

their occupation of northern Ukraine, Rus­

sian  soldiers  not  only  drank  heavily  and

looted  homes  and  shops,  but  murdered

large numbers of civilians. Some have been

rewarded for it. On April 18th the 64th Mo­

torised Infantry Brigade, accused of massa­

cring civilians in Bucha, was decorated by

Mr  Putin  for  its  “mass  heroism  and  cour­

age” and accorded the honour of becoming

a “Guards” unit.

War  crimes  are  not  always  irrational.

They can serve a political purpose, such as

terrorising  the  population  into  submis­

sion. Nor are they incompatible with mili­

tary  prowess:  Nazi  Germany’s  Wehrmacht

was  good  at  both  fighting  and  murdering.

But  brutality  can  also  be  counterproduc­

tive,  inspiring  the  enemy  to  fight  tena­

ciously rather than surrender and risk be­

ing killed anyway.

The savagery and confusion of Russia’s

forces  in  Ukraine  is  consistent  with  their

recent conduct in Syria. Their bombing of

Ukrainian  hospitals  echoes  their  bom­