The Economist May 7th 2022 Finance & economics 71
T
hefirstruleofinvestment,accord
ing to Warren Buffett, is not to lose
money. The second rule is not to forget
the first. That is true for no one more
than bondfund managers, whose job is
to shelter their clients’ money from
volatility while eking out what returns
they can. The bloodbath in bond markets
so far this year—America’s have had their
worst quarter since 2008, and Europe’s
their biggestever peaktotrough
plunge—ought to be the ultimate night
mare for such timorous investors. In
stead many are sighing in relief.
After a brutal but brief crash when the
world shut down in March 2020, and
until the end of last year, rule number
one was pretty easy to follow. Central
banks were pumping $11trn of new funds
into the markets via quantitative easing
and keeping interest rates at rock bot
tom. Governments offered unprecedent
ed fiscal support for businesses to stop
them going bust.
The corollary was that the best thing
for bond investors to do was to close
their eyes and lend. Quibbling about
trivia like the state of the borrower’s
balancesheet or capital discipline
seemed like a quaint tradition. In gener
al, highrisk, highyield debt performed
best. Yet the market’s foremost trait was
“low dispersion”: a tendency for returns
across sectors, issuers and creditrating
bands to be unusually similar.
There is plenty of money to be made
in such a market, which a credit strat
egist at a Wall Street bank describes as “a
rising tide lifting all boats”. But it is
awkward for active fund managers,
whose craft is to use financial nous to
select particular bonds hoping they will
beat the broader market. Measured by
monthly returns between January and
October 2021, for instance, around 95% of
America’s corporate bonds performed
better than Treasuries, with the lion’s
share clustered together. That made it
hard for prudent bondpickers to stand out.
Yet this state of affairs has started to
reverse—and dispersion is back with a
vengeance, the strategist says. The suc
cessful rollout of covid19 vaccinations
last year had already “squeezed the excess
juice” out of those few sectors, like travel
and leisure, whose debt was not already at
a high valuation, reducing its potential to
appreciate further. Now headwinds, from
inflation and snarledup supply chains to
recession risk and the withdrawal of easy
money, are blowing against borrowers,
clouding the outlook further.
These hindrances are so broad that few
companies are able to avoid them. But
firms differ widely in their ability to cope.
Take inflation. Businesses with rocksolid
brands and unassailable market shares,
like CocaCola or Nestlé, have had little
trouble increasing their prices to mitigate
rising costs. Other companies—Netflix,
for example—have suffered.
Such variation in pricing power
spreads well beyond consumerfacing
sectors: commodity producers in general
are much better positioned to face down
ballooning energy and metals prices
than commodity purchasers. Those
commodity producers that are less ex
posed to Chinese lockdowns—energy
firms as opposed to miners, for in
stance—are better placed still. At the
other end lie industries such as carmak
ing, vulnerable to both supplychain
snags and recessioninduced damage to
consumer sentiment.
This adds up to a minefield for in
vestors, whatever their asset class. For
bondpickers, divergence will be further
fuelled by a withdrawal of liquidity from
the market. On June 1st the Federal Re
serve will begin winding down its $5.8trn
portfolio of Treasuries; by September, it
intends to be shrinking it by $60bn a
month. That amounts to the disappear
ance of an annual buyer of 3% of publicly
held Treasuries, whose yields are thus
likely to rise. As a result corporate bor
rowers will have to work harder to con
vince investors to buy their debt rather
than seek the safety of government
paper. Such a buyers’ market means
more scrutiny of debt issuers, and more
variance in the yields they have to offer.
Active bond investors—or, at least,
those who are any good—will benefit
from this renewed emphasis on funda
mentals. But they will not be the only
ones. Financial markets derive their
value to society from their ability to
allocate capital to those best placed to
make a return on it. A rising tide may lift
all boats, but by diluting the incentive to
discriminate between borrowers it re
duces the efficiency of that allocation. A
credit market that makes more of a dis
tinction between winners and losers is
one step towards restoring it.
ButtonwoodBond villains
Who wins from carnage in the credit markets?
di, one of the lenders ordered to transfer
him money, warned that the ruling would
lead to “unequal treatment” of depositors.
To show its commitment to fairness,
Bank Audi has shut dozens of accounts
held by British citizens or residents. So has
at least one other lender. Depositors say
they were offered a chance to reopen their
accounts if they signed a contract that
waived their right to sue and stipulated
they could not make transfers abroad. Oth
erwise, their balances would be paid out in
a cheque, all but useless in a country with a
defunct banking system.
A few have tried more desperate mea
sures. In January the owner of a café in the
eastern Bekaa valley doused his bank’s lob
by in petrol and demanded $50,000 from
his account. He got his money (his sister
says he signed a receipt). Some Lebanese
cheered his boldness. Others saw a symp
tom of everything that ails their country,
where force trumps the rule of law.
The lawsuits may soon have little effect:
the capitalcontrols law would void them.
“It’s like an amnesty for bankers,” says
Fouad Debs of the Depositors Union.
The government has proposed guaran
teeing accounts under $100,000, though
depositors may have to wait up to eight
years to withdraw their full savings. Larger
balances would receive a haircut.
Even if Lebanon’s banks escape a legal
reckoning, their industry seems wrecked
for a generation. Lebanon has become a
cash economy. Many businesses no longer
accept card payments. The sprawling dias
pora, which once poured billions into Leb
anese lenders, will probably keep its mon
ey abroad. “If we don’t seebanks pay the
price for what happened,”saysMsEgo, “we
can never trust them again.”n