“The F-16 was employed with HARMs
in one of two ways. In general terms, a
‘range-known shot’ was against a speciic
site, usually a strategic SAM, for which
we had co-ordinates. All the targeting
information was programmed into the
HARM system by the pilot before the
mission. Since a HARM shot from an
F-16 doesn’t get real-time information, the
probability of kill depends on the pilot being
as close to his programmed parameters as
possible. Sounds easy, but at 550 KTAS
[Knots True Air Speed] at 250ft or in the
chaos of combat it can be tough.
“The other method is called the ‘range-
unknown shot’. The F-4G located an
emitting radar and pointed the F-16 at it.
Which meant getting a lot closer to the SAM
you were trying to kill. I need to emphasize
that both of these F-16 delivery proiles
solely depended on the F-4G’s capability to
see the emitter, determine its location and
range, and pass that to the F-16.”
In 1988, United States Air Forces in
Europe (USAFE) placed a greater emphasis
on the Weasel role in negating Warsaw Pact
integrated air defence systems (IADS). It also
ensured support for the mission by deploying
jamming platforms to disrupt the enemy’s
communication and surveillance radars.
General Dynamics EF-111A Aardvarks
at RAF Upper Heyford, Oxfordshire and
Lockheed EC-130H Hercules at Sembach
AB in West Germany were used in this role
as well as US Navy and US Marine Corps
Grumman EA-6B Prowlers.
Under cover of this jamming umbrella
the SEAD F-4Gs and F-16Cs would target
speciic SAM sites with the intention
of rendering them inoperable. The
effectiveness of a SEAD mission was not
determined by the number of SAM or AAA
sites destroyed, but if they were rendered
impotent by the intervention of the Wild
Weasel hunter/killer team. The ultimate
aim of the Weasel mission was to ensure
that the radars controlling the IADS were
incapable of responding to an air attack.
This could mean simply taking the radar off
the air for a time. Destroying the site was
an added bonus.DESERT SHIELD
Iraq invading Kuwait in 1990 led to two
squadrons of the 52nd TFW deploying to the
Middle East. Just prior to this all the F-4Gs
in the 480th TFS were transferred to the
81st TFS along with their crews, while the
81st TFS F-16s and their pilots were moved
to the 480th. The 81st TFS and 480th
TFS deployed to Sheik Isa AB in Bahrain
in December 1990 and January 1991
respectively. The 23rd TFS was left as the
only mixed F-4G/F-16 unit which was sent to
Incirlik AB, Turkey in January.Lt Col Dittmer recalls this deployment
and division of forces: “My brother, Kurt
Dittmer, along with a few other 52nd
weapons officers came up with the idea
for a northern front stationed out of Incirlik
AB. The intent was to make Iraq deal with
two separate fronts, thus splitting its forces.
The plan was leshed out and was briefed
to the Pentagon and approved. The SEAD
support for this northern front was the
only remaining SEAD forces we had left
[at Spangdahlem] – the mixed F-4G/F-16s
of the 23rd TFS. My brother was sent to
Incirlik in October to start setting things up.
I had recently been transferred to 17th AF
as a staff officer but was still lying with the
23rd. Fortunately, I was also still a full-up
instructor pilot, standardisation evaluator
and mission ready, which is why I got to
take part.”
The 23rd TFS, in common with other
SEAD units in theatre, was very active in
the irst few days of the war. The unit