political conFlictS and Migration in the Mena StateS 161
of the respective national economies, and the wide gap between the energy
and non-energy sectors in the resource-rich countries. This disparity has
only increased in recent years due to the dramatic rise in the amount of
foreign-currency proceeds from the export of oil and natural gas. Countries
such as Morocco or Jordan suffer greatly from having to import their oil
needs, whereas other countries of the Gulf region have diff iculty absorbing
the enormous amounts of foreign cash f lowing into the country.
In addition, there are the more-or-less-irreversible structural conditions
- in part very conf lict-laden – affecting the MENA states, especially in areas
other than energy infrastructure (e.g., limited agricultural areas resulting in
a high need for imports, considerable freshwater def icits and high ecological
impact). Nearly all states in the region still have populations on the increase
(and birth-control programmes of little consequence), which contributes to
the large present and future challenges facing the governments.^4
This is true for the ability of resource-poor countries, in particular,
to operate globally as well as for the stability of all political systems in
the region. The governments of the MENA states have to deal with three
sets of problems. First, the direct consequences of the continuing rise in
population (space for additional housing, the foundation of businesses and
services as part of the long-term city and regional planning, the necessary
infrastructure for expanding traff ic, water, energy, schools, hospitals and
health-facility needs, and jobs).
Second, the reaction to the indirect consequences of population expan-
sion. In light of insuff icient infrastructure (government services) and of
widespread government mismanagement, resulting in budgetary resources
being improperly distributed among the population, existing poverty tends
to become cemented and informal political channels and corruption come
to be regarded by the citizens as the only feasible way of surviving.
Third, the susceptibilit y of persons living in povert y and marginalised in
their own societ y to fall prey to ideologies that promise to deliver progress
and to overcome the def iciencies of the existing government.^5 After the
4 From the vantage point of stability and conf lict, however, the absolute number of persons
is not the major factor; rather – in addition to the rate of growth and thus the development of
the individual age groups – a key factor is the distribution of the population in the available
area, while considering the other factors of the respective country and the possibilities the
government/economy has to create jobs or qualify workers. These aspects greatly inf luence
the scale and social consequences of inordinate population growth.
5 In some MENA countries, parts of that group are susceptible to such ideologies, namely,
those groups of the general population that are not poor but are dissatisf ied with their own
social mobility and their access to resources – or put their hope in other, alternative of fers.