98 Boundaries and Beyond
By and large, the Portuguese in Macao were considered less threatening.
By the seventeenth century, as perceived by the President of the Board
of War, Dong Hanru, “although [the Portuguese] are barbarian by nature,
they have long been submissive [and can be trusted]”.^149 This perception
changed in the eighteenth century, and the Chinese did begin to show
some concern about the Portuguese presence in Macao. The Portuguese
were thought to be βierce and cruel and they had the potential to cause
trouble for the Chinese authorities. Their presence was tolerated because
they provided trade opportunities but, for those who thought about the
future, Macao was an unresolved issue and hence a source of anxiety.^150
Such warnings of looming dangers on the sea horizon were cries in
the wilderness. The sense of crisis had subsided by the late eighteenth
century because of the conβidence accumulated through a long century
of peace and prosperity. When Hong Liangji compiled his work Qianlong
fu ting zhou xian tuzhi (Illustrated gazetteer of the prefectures, sub-
prefectures, departments and districts during the Qianlong Reign) in
1788, Holland and England were grouped as trading states along with
other Weste rn countries. Neither was considered threatening. When a
real challenge suddenly emerged in the events that led to the Opium War,
the Chinese did not have the capability to confront the enemy. Wei Yuan
could only propose a retreat as he said,
instead of defending the outer coastal waters, it is better to hold
out in the seaports; instead of holding out at the seaports, it is
better to defend the inner waters (neihe).Only in this last resort would the barbarians lose the superiority given
them by their large, solid warships armed with two tiers of cannon. In the
past, according to Wei Yuan, Wang Hong was able to defeat the Portuguese
in the early 1520s and Zheng Chenggong to rout the Dutch in the outer
seas because both made use of favorable winds and currents and could
therefore launch surprise attacks on the enemy. If both sides had held
on longer, the Chinese war junk would not have been able to match the
Western man-of-war in construction and maneuverability.^151 Retreat, not
advance, was the only alternative available to the Qing authorities in the
nineteenth century.
- “Ming shilu Minhai guanxi shiliao” 明實錄閩海關係史料, in TWWXCK, no. 296,
p. 129. - XFHZYDCC, 9: 320a.
- For Wei Yuan’s remarks cited here, see HGTZ, 1: 1a–2b.
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