introduction 13example, in the context of the human capacity for producing “nonsensu-
ous similarities” (such as those observable in astrology and divination),
I am instead concerned with “sensuous” similarities (such as those ob-
served in the mimetic relationships between originals and copies that I
focus on in this book). Benjamin broaches the sensuous only briefly by
referring to play and dance. W hat interests me about Benjamin’s concep-
tion of mimesis is the “powerful compulsion to become similar and to be-
have mimetically” that he insists on. Unfortunately, however, he does not
say anything about what triggers this compulsion, for even “the ancients”
cannot have felt a compulsion to behave mimetically in the face of each
and every phenomenon they encountered.
In his seminal study The Red Fez: Art and Spirit Possession in Africa,
Fritz Kramer (1993) provides an answer to this question. His object is the
representation of alien others in African plastic and performing arts. Ac-
cording to Kramer, the unity of such representations lies in their display of
realism, which prior to the colonial encounter was absent from the idealist
traditions of African art. Borrowing his concept from Erich Auerbach’s
study of mimesis in literature, Kramer defines realism as the “interpreta-
tion of the real by mimesis” (ix). The spirits of European alterity, which
we encounter in chapter 1 of this book, where I discuss Hausa rituals of
spirit possession in Nigeria, are part of this realist tradition. Drawing on
Godfrey Lienhardt’s cosmology of the Dinka, Kramer interprets such
spirits as images of passiones, as ritual representations of external forces
that moved and overwhelmed not only the Dinka but also other Africans
(58–59). Kramer, who speaks of a compulsion to imitate in the face of
alterity, takes recourse with Plato and calls mimesis “a basic form of hu-
man behavior which is not primarily purposive” (251). Though we still
need to learn more about the specific contexts of such imitations, this
conceptualization already helps us understand why copies of European
conduct and technology in African arts and ritual should not be regarded
as intentional buffoonery or parody, as suggested by Lips (1937) and Stoller
(1984), respectively. A shorthand for Kramer’s argument would be that
contact with alterity likely triggers copying. This, however, is only half of
what is at stake in such mediations, for the copy thus obtained might as
well serve a number of purposes—to connect with what has been copied,
for example.